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Eric Biber* & Elisabeth Long Esposito†

THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE ORGANIC ACT
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
ABSTRACT
This article examines the future of the National Park Service
Organic Act in a changing climate. Managers and scholars have
raised questions about whether the Organic Act gives the Park
Service sufficient authority to undertake the steps necessary to
adapt to climate change. This article concludes that the Organic
Act and park-specific enabling acts, as interpreted by the courts,
grant the Park Service wide discretion to pursue management
options for adaptation to climate change impacts on national park
resources. It also concludes that the Organic Act, properly
understood, does impose some necessary constraints on agency
decision-making, constraints that prevent inappropriate
development projects and that require thoughtful decision-making
to minimize the risk of unintended management consequences.
Overall, the Organic Act will remain relevant into the next
century.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress created the National Park Service (Park Service) in 1916 with the
enactment of the Organic Act. The Organic Act establishes the basic standards by
which the Park Service manages the public lands entrusted to it. As such, the Organic
Act provides a crucial legal framework for Park Service management decisions. It
also provides the basis for many (although by no means all) legal challenges to the
Park Service’s decision-making in the courts. It is the legal standard that Park Service
policy documents generally cite as the basis for the standards they set and is often
referred to and relied upon in political debates over Park Service decision-making.
Climate change is a fundamental challenge to the future management of our
national parks—perhaps the most important challenge.1 Thus, it is no surprise that
* Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
† Natural Resources Associate, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, Santa Barbara, CA. J.D.,
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Special thanks to Caitlin Brown for research
assistance. We are grateful to Bob Keiter for helpful comments.
1. In the National Park Service’s (NPS) 2010 Climate Change Response Strategy, Director Jonathan
Jarvis asserted that “climate change is fundamentally the greatest threat to the integrity of our national
parks that we have ever experienced.” NAT’L PARK SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY 1
(2010) [hereinafter NAT’L PARK SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY]. See also, The Impacts
of Climate Change on America’s National Parks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. On Nat. Resources, 111th
Cong. (2009) (statement of Regional Director, Pacific West Region, Nat’l Park Serv., Dep’t of the Interior,
Jonathan B. Jarvis) (“Climate change is potentially the most far-reaching and consequential challenge to
our mission than any previously encountered in the entire history of the NPS.”) [hereinafter JARVIS
TESTIMONY].
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managers, scientists, and scholars have discussed whether the fundamental legal
authority for the Park Service and its management of the park system—the Organic
Act—will allow the Park Service to adequately respond to climate change.2
The Organic Act requires that the Park Service manage the national parks
to “conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the System
units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery, natural and historic objects,
and wild life in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for
the enjoyment of future generations.”3 Some observers contend that this standard
requires the Park Service to maintain park conditions that are more or less consistent
with those present before European contact with the Americas, and to emphasize
hands-off or passive management to achieve that goal.4 Given the large-scale impacts
that climate change will impose on park ecosystems, maintenance of those precontact conditions will require massive human intervention (inconsistent with
passive management); alternatively, passive management will allow fundamental
changes in park conditions (inconsistent with maintaining pre-contact baseline
conditions).5 Accordingly, some observers argue that the legal standards in the
Organic Act are inconsistent with the 21st century management needs of the Park
Service, and should be reconsidered.6 Even the Park Service has pondered whether
2. See id.; see also Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Legal Adaptive Capacity: How
Program Goals and Processes Shape Federal Land Adaptation to Climate Change, U. COLO. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016) (“The statutory regimes that govern management of . . . the national parks are rooted
in historical and wildness preservation goals that impair agencies’ ability to meet climate-related
threats.”); L.C. Jantarasami, J. J. Lawler, & C. W. Thomas, Institutional Barriers to Climate Change
Adaptation in U.S. National Parks and Forests, 15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 33 (2010) (NPS employees from
three national parks in Washington State overwhelmingly identified the Organic Act as a barrier to climate
change adaptation).
3. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014)). The
Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014), was amended and recodified in 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014).
See National Park Service and Related Programs, Pub. L. 113-287, § 7, Dec. 19, 2014, 128 Stat. 3272.
Although this article refers to “Section 1” and “Section 3” of the Organic Act, the code sections have
changed. We refer to Sections 1 and 3 because of their long historical use in describing the relevant
sections of the Act.
4. See WILLIAM C. TWEED, UNCERTAIN PATH: A SEARCH FOR THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL PARKS 2,
34 (2010); Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 2; Alejandro E. Camacho, Transforming the Means and
Ends of Natural Resources Management, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1429–30 (2011) (stating that the Organic
Act has a “preservation goal [that] mandates that the NPS cannot approve an action if it could lead to the
impairment of any preexisting resources.”).
5. See William C. Tweed, An Idea In Trouble: Thoughts About the Future of Traditional National
Parks in the United States, 27 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 6, 8 (2010) (“Proactive management elements that
today would be clearly rejected, such as facilitating the migration of native species to new locales where
they might survive in a changing climate regime, would become acceptable.”); id. (future will call for “a
degree of hands-on management of natural resources that rejects completely the nineteenth century
assumptions of the national park movement’s founders.”); TWEED, UNCERTAIN PATH, supra note 4, at
195–201; Camacho, Transforming the Means, supra note 4, at 1407, 1432–36. See also NATIONAL PARK
SYSTEM ADVISORY BOARD, REVISITING LEOPOLD: RESOURCE STEWARDSHIP IN THE NATIONAL PARKS 8
(2012) (noting “necessity that management ‘may involve active manipulation of the plant and animal
communities, or protection from modification or external influences.’”).
6. See Tweed, An Idea In Trouble, supra note 5, at 6 (“The concept that a ‘fence of law’ can be
erected around a portion of an ecosystem and that the area contained within that hypothetical fence can
be maintained forever ‘unimpaired for future generations’ can no longer be defended.”); TWEED,
UNCERTAIN PATH, supra note 4, at 206 (calling for consideration to change the unimpaired mandate to be
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“[m]odification to existing laws and policies may be necessary to clarify roles,
responsibilities, and authorities for enacting climate change response actions.”7
However, not everyone in the Park Service believes that these modifications are
necessary. According to Park Service Director Jonathan Jarvis, the Organic Act
provides much needed guidance in the face of climate change—it directs that the
Park Service “shall not sit idle,” but rather “conserve” the resources in national parks
“in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for future
generations.”8 Director Jarvis interprets the phrase “by such manner and by such
means” as giving the Park Service “latitude to use whatever resources we have to
protect parks in a future that has been characterized as ‘hot, flat and crowded.’”9
These specific critiques of the Organic Act coincide with more general
arguments that environmental and natural resources law must become more flexible
to allow for adaptation to climate change. According to some scholars, climate
change will make obsolete many of the goals under existing environmental and
natural resources law, particularly those based on a vision of a stable natural world
that can be protected from human intervention.10 Likewise, the rigidity in existing
environmental law is incompatible with adaptation to climate change because it
constrains the experimentation and novel active management tools needed to deal
with unprecedented changes in natural systems.11 In a similar vein, some
“more in line with our times.”); Camacho, Transforming the Means, supra note 4, at 1407 (stating that by
producing “fundamental ecological changes from prior conditions, climate change makes the significant
costs and ultimate unsuitability of the National Parks Organic Act’s historical preservation . . . goal
particularly evident”); Camacho & Glicksman, supra note 2 (“we urge refashioning the standards,
statutory and otherwise that govern federal lands to enhance” the ability of agencies to respond to climate
change) (calling for changes away from historical baselines as the management guidance for national
parks, “changes [that] may come in the form of statutory amendments to the Park Service Organic Act”).
For analysis that concedes the challenges that climate change poses to the Park System but argues that
existing law is up to the task, see Robert B. Keiter, Revisiting the Organic Act: Can It Meet the Next
Century’s Conservation Challenges? 28 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 240, 246 (2011).
7. NAT’L PARK SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSE STRATEGY, supra note 1, at 15, 23 (among the
“several overarching questions [that] must be addressed” are: “How does the NPS reconcile its definition
of ‘natural’ (absence of human domination over the landscape) with the effects on resources resulting
from climate changes that are understood to be caused, at least in part, by human activities? How does the
NPS comply with mandates and policies for conservation and maintenance of natural conditions? . . . How
does the NPS comply with the ‘no impairment’ mandate when the geographic range and even existence
of resources is threatened by climate change? . . . How will the NPS comply with laws and regulations
that do not take into account climate change?”).
8. Id. at 1.
9. Id.
10. Robin Kundis Craig, “Stationarity Is Dead”—Long Live Transformation: Five Principles for
Climate Change Adaptation Law, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 9, 17 (2010) (“Existing environmental and
natural resource laws are preservationist, grounded in the old stationarity framework that no longer reflects
ecological realities. In contrast, the new climate change adaptation law needs to incorporate a far more
flexible view of the natural world.”); Camacho, Transforming the Means, supra note 4, at 1436; Julie
Lurman Joly, Climate Adaptation Strategies are Limited by Outdated Legal Interpretations, 30 GEORGE
WRIGHT F. 45, 45 (2013) (“A cogent criticism of current US federal public lands law, particularly with
regard to the most preservation-oriented protected areas, is its emphasis on maintaining, restoring, or
reproducing historical conditions.”).
11. See J.B. Ruhl, Climate Change Adaptation and the Structural Transformation of Environmental
Law, 40 ENVTL. L. 363, 422 (2009) (“[T]he role of environmental law, if it is to contribute to climate
change adaptation, cannot be to impede and obstruct [adaptation] through rigid command-and-control
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commentators have argued that flexibility in environmental law is essential for the
implementation of adaptive management, which in turn is required to reduce
uncertainty in a world affected by climate change.12
Thus, understanding whether and how the Organic Act facilitates
management for a future of climate change is important—not just for the future of
our national parks, but also for understanding the broader implications of climate
change for environmental and natural resources law in the United States.
It is important to note, however, that the Organic Act is far from the only
important legal framework for Park Service management decision-making. Most
national parks were created as units of the National Park System through their own
specific enabling legislation—this legislation often imposes specific mandates,
duties, or powers on the Park Service in managing individual units.13 Indeed, the
legal constraints imposed by these enabling laws can be much more significant for
day-to-day management than those imposed by the Organic Act.14
Apart from the Organic Act, a range of other environmental and natural
resources laws that apply to all federal agencies also apply to the Park Service. The
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)15 and the Endangered Species Act
(ESA)16 are the most important of these laws. NEPA requires all federal agencies to
assess the potential environmental impacts of actions they propose to undertake, to
evaluate alternatives to proposed actions, and to receive public comment on any
major environmental review documents.17 The ESA prohibits federal agencies from
taking actions that would jeopardize the existence of threatened and endangered
species.18 Both laws have had major impacts on the Park Service’s decision-making,
and are potentially more likely than the Organic Act to lead to litigation against the
Park Service.19 Thus, an assessment of the amount of leeway the Park Service has
under the Organic Act to respond to climate change is not a complete assessment of
whether the entire legal framework under which the Park Service operates allows for
adequate responses to climate change.

mechanisms.”); id. at 416–23 (arguing for shift from decision-making that focuses on ex ante analysis of
environmental impacts, including significant judicial review, because it interferes with the flexibility and
experimentation that climate change adaptation requires); J.B. Ruhl, General Design Principles for
Resilience and Adaptive Capacity in Legal Systems—With Applications to Climate Change Adaptation,
89 N.C. L. REV. 1373, 1392–93 (2011); Camacho, Transforming the Means, supra note 4, at 1413–17.
12. See Eric Biber, Adaptive Management and the Future of Environmental Law, 46 AKRON L. REV.
933, 934–39 (2013) (summarizing this literature); see also Joly, supra note 10, at 48 (“Developing new
laws or amendments to older ones that rely on resilience theory, adaptive management, and managing
uncertainty is an important, though perhaps long-range, goal.”).
13. See Robert L. Fischman, The Problem of Statutory Detail in National Park Establishment
Legislation and Its Relationship to Pollution Control Law, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 779 (1997).
14. See id.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
16. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2012).
19. See, e.g., Denise E. Antolini, National Park Law in the U.S.: Conservation, Conflict, and
Centennial Values, WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 851, 896 (2009) (“Many cases against the
NPS involve both the Organic Act and the National Environmental Policy Act.”).
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Nonetheless, a focused analysis on the role the Organic Act will play in
climate change adaptation is important, given the high-profile nature of the Organic
Act, its central role in restricting the kinds of actions that the Park Service can
consider undertaking, and the specific critiques of the law that it may be inadequate
to address climate change. If the Organic Act is inadequate, then changes in the law
will be required, regardless of amendments to NEPA and the ESA. Our question is
whether such changes are, indeed, required.
Part II begins with a very brief overview of the management options that
have been proposed for adaptation to climate change impacts on national park
resources. Part III describes the amount of leeway the Park Service may have to
pursue those management options under the Organic Act and park-specific enabling
acts. Part IV concludes by noting the tremendous discretion that the Park Service has
to pursue climate change adaptation efforts on its lands, while complying with the
necessary constraints.
II. MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
The Park Service’s recent focus has been on “no regrets” climate change
adaptation actions.20 Similarly, the Department of the Interior’s (Interior) 2014
Climate Change Adaptation Plan instructs agencies to “[a]void ‘maladaptive’
actions, that is, actions intended to avoid or reduce vulnerability to climate change
that negatively impact or increase the vulnerability of other systems, sectors, or
social groups.”21 However, the scientific literature, and reports produced by
conservation organizations and agencies alike, question whether more aggressive
adaptation actions, like assisted migration, are desirable in national parks to respond
to climate change. This begs the question—does the Organic Act allow the Park
Service discretion to use all of the management resources in its climate change
adaptation arsenal? In order to begin exploring that question, this section briefly
reviews a range of climate change impacts on national parks, both extant and
projected, and then discusses a number of adaptation actions that have been or could
be proposed in national parks.22
Climate change will cause a variety of transformations in national parks.
Interior’s 2014 Climate Change Adaptation Plan recognizes that “[c]limate change
is now affecting, and will increasingly affect the ability of the NPS to conserve park
resources in an ‘unimpaired’ condition.”23 Indeed, changes have already begun. Even
a decade ago, there was evidence that pine forests in Bandelier and Rocky Mountain
National Parks were experiencing elevated mortality due to higher temperatures,
drought, and the expansion of beetle infestations to higher elevations and new
20. NAT’L PARK SERV., CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION PLAN 2012–2014 4 (2012) [hereinafter NPS
ACTION PLAN].
21. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, CLIMATE CHANGE ADAPTATION PLAN 18 (2014) [hereinafter DOI
ADAPTATION PLAN].
22. For a more extensive discussion of climate change adaptation strategies suggested by managers
and scientists for application on federal lands, see Elisabeth Long & Eric Biber, The Wilderness Act and
Climate Change Adaptation, 44 ENVTL. L. 623 (2014); Elisabeth Long, Wyoming v. USDA: A Look Down
the Road at Management of Inventoried Roadless Areas for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation,
40 ECOLOGY L.Q. 329 (2013).
23. DOI ADAPTATION PLAN, supra note 21, at 7.
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ranges.24 Scientists have likewise documented high elevation species like the pika
and alpine chipmunk in Yosemite and Great Basin National Parks “moving upslope,
thereby reducing the effective area for their survival.”25 Park Service leaders suggest
that climate change may be contributing to changes in the frequency and intensity of
wildfire26—data shows that the average duration of wildfires in national parks has
increased from less than 10 days to more than one month and that fire seasons are
growing longer.27
These types of changes will continue and intensify. Interior recognizes that
“climate change will fundamentally alter iconic features or resources of parks” by
causing negative impacts to cultural resources, the loss of glaciers from Denali,
Glacier, and Mount Rainier National Parks, and Joshua trees from Joshua Tree
National Park.28 Climate change will affect forest health by causing an increase in

24. JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1; see also Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate
Change, 42 ENVTL. L. 313, 329–30 (2012) (summarizing studies on the effects of bark beetles in western
parks) (citing STEPHEN SAUNDERS ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS IN PERIL: THE THREATS OF CLIMATE
DISRUPTION 21 (2009); A. Park Williams et al., Forest Responses to Increasing Aridity and Warmth in
the Southwestern United States, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 21289, 21291 (2010); David N. Cole &
Laurie Yung, Park and Wilderness Stewardship: The Dilemma of Management Intervention, in BEYOND
NATURALNESS: RETHINKING PARK AND WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 1, 2–
4 (David N. Cole & Laurie Yung eds., 2010).
25. JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1; see also Wendee Holtcamp, Silence of the Pikas, 60
BIOSCIENCE 8 (2010); C. Moritz et al., Impact of a Century of Climate Change on Small-Mammal
Communities in Yosemite National Park, 322 SCI. 261 (2008); COLLARED PIKA, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct.
3, 2015), http://www.nps.gov/articles/collared-pika.htm (discussing risks of climate change altering the
alpine environment in Alaska and northwest Canada where collared pika presently live).
26. JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1 (“Fire frequency and intensity may also be related to climate
change.”); see also IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 51, http://epic.awi.de/37530/1/
IPCC_AR5_SYR_Final.pdf (“Increases in the frequency or intensity of ecosystem disturbances such as
droughts, windstorms, fires and pest outbreaks have been detected in many parts of the world and in some
cases are attributed to climate change (medium confidence).”).
27. JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1 (“fire ignitions are occurring both earlier and later in the
season”) (citing A.L. Westerling et al., Warming and Earlier Spring Increase in Western U.S. Forest
Wildfire Activity, 313 SCI. 940 (2006)). Changes in fire intensity and extent have had effects on both
natural and cultural resources. For example, at Mesa Verde National Park and Bandelier National
Monument, fires have caused damage to historic structures and threatened archeological sites. JARVIS
TESTIMONY, supra note 1; FIRE, SOIL, AND PRESERVING HISTORY AT BANDELIER, NAT’L PARK SERV.
(Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.nps.gov/articles/bandfire.htm (discussing efforts by park staff to “help
archaeological sites to resist climate change by slowing the factors that exacerbate the effects of climate
change.”).
28. DOI ADAPTATION PLAN, supra note 21, at 7; see also JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1, at 3
(noting that Joshua Tree National Park “may lose its namesake species as warmer winters cause the
freezing temperatures required for the trees’ reproduction to occur less frequently”); AGGRADATION,
AVULSION, AND THE HISTORIC NISQUALLY ROAD AT MOUNT RAINIER, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct. 3, 2015),
http://www.nps.gov/articles/moraroad.htm; GLACIER MONITORING IN DENALI, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct.
3, 2015), http://www.nps.gov/articles/denali-glacier-monitoring.htm; Cameron W. Barrows et al.,
Designing a Sustainable Monitoring Framework for Assessing Impacts of Climate Change at Joshua Tree
National Park, USA, 23 BIODIVERSITY & CONSERVATION 3263 (2014) (discussing climate change risk to
Joshua Trees and other species); Elspeth Dehnert, Climate Change Threatens U.S. National Parks, SCI.
AM., (Jul. 3, 2014), http://www.scientificamerian.com/article/climate-change-threatens-u-s-nationalparks/ (quoting Secretary of the Interior Sally Jewell as saying: “Through sound science and collaboration,
we need to examine how we can help cultural and natural resources adapt to climate change and become
more resilient to its impacts.”).
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disturbances such as fire, insects, and disease.29 Climate change will also increase
species extinctions and cause extirpations of local populations.30
Sea level rise may present a particular challenge because the Park Service
manages approximately 34 million acres of land in 84 marine and coastal national
parks.31 Rising sea levels may cause the inundation of low-lying coastal parks,
resulting in the loss of habitat, cultural, and historical features.32 Likewise, climate
change may bring more frequent and intense coastal storms and flooding.33
To address these and other climate change effects, a wide variety of
adaptation actions may be proposed in national parks. The Park Service has defined
climate change adaptation as “activities that help people and natural systems better
cope with climate change effects by moderating harm or exploiting beneficial
opportunities.”34 Adaptation includes both passive (e.g., “selecting certain areas in
which no interventions will occur”35) and active management strategies. Passive
29. See Nicholas A. Fisichelli et al., Climate, Trees, Pests, and Weeds: Change, Uncertainty, and
Biotic Stressors in Eastern U.S. National Park Forests, 327 FOREST ECOLOGY & MGMT. 31 (2014);
DAVID L. PETERSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., PNW-GTR-855, RESPONDING TO CLIMATE CHANGE
IN NATIONAL FORESTS: A GUIDEBOOK FOR DEVELOPING ADAPTATION OPTIONS 1 (2011), http://www.fs.
fed.us/pnw_gtr855/htm [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK FOR DEVELOPING ADAPTATION OPTIONS]; JOHN T.
KLIEJUNAS, U.S. FOREST SERV., PSW-GTR-236, A RISK ASSESSMENT OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE
IMPACT OF FOREST DISEASES ON FOREST ECOSYSTEMS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES AND CANADA
7 (2011), http://www.fs.fed.us/psw/publications/documents/psw_gtr236/pse_gtr236.pdf (“Climate
influences the survival and spread of pathogens as well as the susceptibility of their hosts. Climate change
could alter stages and rates of development of the pathogen, modify host resistance, and lead to changes
in the physiology of host-pathogen interactions.”); C. Drew Harvell, et al., Climate Warming and Disease
Risks for Terrestrial and Marine Biota, 296 SCI. 2158, 2159–60 (2002) (explaining that higher winter
temperatures will likely increase plant disease severity because “[g]reater overwintering success of
pathogens will likely increase disease severity.”).
30. David A. Keith et al., Detecting Extinction Risk from Climate Change by IUCN Red List Criteria,
28 CONSERV. BIO. 810, 810–19 (2014) (“Anthropogenic climate change is a key threat to global
biodiversity.”); Jessica C. Stanton et al., Warning Times for Species Extinctions Due to Climate Change,
21 GLOB. CHANGE BIO. 1066, 1066 (2015) (describing climate change as “an increasingly major obstacle
to slowing the rate of species extinctions.”); Jonathan R. Mawdsley et al., A Review of Climate-Change
Adaptation Strategies for Wildlife Management and Biodiversity Conservation, 23 CONSERV. BIO. 1080,
1084 (2009); N. S. Sodhi et al., Causes and Consequences of Species Extinctions, in THE PRINCETON
GUIDE TO ECOLOGY 514–20 (S. A. LEVIN ed., 2009).
31. DOI ADAPTATION PLAN, supra note 21, at 37.
32. Id. at 7; Maria Caffrey & Rebecca Beavers, Planning for the Impact of Sea-Level Rise on U.S.
National Parks, 30 PARK SCI. 6 (2013); E. ROBERT THIELER ET AL., VULNERABILITY OF U.S. NATIONAL
PARKS TO SEA-LEVEL RISE AND COASTAL CHANGE, USGS FACT SHEET 095-02,
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs095-02/fs095-02.html (last visited May 31, 2015).
33. DOI ADAPTATION PLAN, supra note 21, at 37; U.S. EPA, Climate Impacts on Coastal Areas,
http://www3.epa.gov/climatechange/impacts/coasts.html (last visited May 31, 2015) (summarizing
climate change impacts on coastal areas).
34. NPS ACTION PLAN, supra note 20, at 9. Likewise, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change defines adaptation as the “[a]djustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or
expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.”
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, WORKING GROUP II, FOURTH ASSESSMENT
REPORT, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY § 18.1.2 (Martin Parry et
al. eds., 2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/wg2/en/ch18s18-1-2.html.
35. Nathan L. Stephenson & Constance I. Millar, Climate Change: Wilderness’s Greatest Challenge,
28 PARK SCI. 34, 35 (2012); Nathan L. Stephenson & Constance I. Millar, Climate Change: Wilderness’s
Greatest Challenge in USDA FOREST SERV. RMRS-P-71 455 (2014). Other passive management

200

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 56

management strategies may be especially appropriate in national parks, and are
frequently proposed for climate change adaptation. In addition to prohibiting
interventions on specific national parks, other examples of passive management for
climate change adaptation include acquiring additional land to provide a wider range
of habitat or migration corridors, both of which may be crucial as climate change
causes species shifts and spurs migration.36 However, active management strategies
tend to be more controversial, and will accordingly raise interesting legal questions.
Therefore, this section focuses on active management strategies that have been
proposed to respond to climate change effects, both in the near- and long-term. 37
A. Adaptation Actions for the Near-Term
Two categories of actions have been proposed in the scientific and
management literature for near-term park management as a means of “buying
time.”38 One category of actions includes those that are “designed to resist change,”
or promote climate change “resistance.”39 The other category—actions to promote
“resilience”—seeks to enhance the ability of ecosystems to “withstand or absorb
increasing effects without irreversible changes” to processes or functions. 40 These
strategies focus primarily on facilitating the persistence of current ecosystems and

strategies for climate change adaptation include protecting “unfragmented habitat areas and the key habitat
linkages among them.” DOI ADAPTATION PLAN, supra note 21, at 18.
36. Scott G. Zolkos, Projected Tree Species Redistribution Under Climate Change: Implications for
Ecosystem Vulnerability Across Protected Areas in the Eastern United States, 18 ECOSYSTEMS 202, 216
(2015) (“Given the rapid shifts in tree species habitats expected during the coming century, enhancing
connectivity, conserving migration ‘corridors’, or augmenting protected areas to include ecosystems
encompassing park units (that is, PACEs) could reduce species vulnerability to climate change over longer
time scales by connecting current and future suitable habitat conditions . . . or by decreasing isolation and
edge effects, particularly for species projected to lose habitat space in park units or those within migration
distance of a PACE.”); Craig L. Shafer, From Non-Static Vignettes to Unprecedented Change: The U.S.
National Park System, Climate Impacts and Animal Dispersal, 40 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 26 (discussing
Interior’s acknowledgement that habitat corridors are needed to allow dispersal of “climate stressed
animals”); J.S. BARON ET AL., U.S. EPA, ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE-SENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS
& RESOURCES 1, 29 (2008) [hereinafter NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS], http://www.
werc.usgs.gov/ProductDetails.aspx?ID=3615 (recommending the reduction of fragmentation and
“maintain or restore species migration corridors to facilitate natural flow of genes, species and
populations” in National Parks).
37. In identifying management options, we do not intend to endorse (or reject) any of them. Indeed,
many of these options may not be appropriate or effective in particular circumstances, or in general. We
also note that effective adaptation to climate change may require coordination across park borders with
private and public land managers. See, e.g., ROBERT B. KEITER, TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL PARK IDEA 267–70 (2013) [hereinafter KEITER, TO CONSERVE
UNIMPAIRED].
38. Stephenson & Millar, PARK SCI., supra note 35, at 3–4; Stephenson & Millar, RMRS-P-71, supra
note 35, at 456.
39. Stephenson & Millar, PARK SCI., supra note 35, at 4; Stephenson & Millar, RMRS-P-71, supra
note 35, at 456.
40. PETERSON ET AL., GUIDEBOOK FOR DEVELOPING ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 29, at 60
(resilience is the most often recommended strategy for climate change adaptation).
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species assemblages, rather than assisting transitions to new states that may not have
existed prior to European contact.41
A variety of examples for near-term adaptation have been suggested for
implementation in national parks and their ecosystems. For example, a report on
climate adaptation options for national parks discusses the benefits of removing
barriers to upstream migration in rivers and streams in order to improve the resilience
of aquatic species and ecosystems.42 Managers may also propose the management of
natural ignitions, prescribed fire, or thinning projects to reduce risk of wildfire,
promote forest health, reduce stand densities, or benefit plants and wildlife in
national parks.43 These treatments may be prescribed in parks44 where a warmer and
drier climate requires lower stand densities to reduce competition for resources, like
water, to increase tree vigor, and to decrease the risk of tree mortality due to insect
outbreaks.45 For example, prescribed fire, felling and leaving trees in place, and
management of wildfires have been proposed “to reduce stand densities and drought
stress” in Olympic National Park.46
Minimizing the alteration of natural disturbance regimes by allowing
natural ignitions to burn or by decommissioning roads may build resilience in a

41. See Stephenson & Millar, PARK SCI., supra note 35, at 3; Stephenson & Millar, RMRS-P-71,
supra note 35, at 456.
42. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 29.
43. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 18–19, 29 (“Use
wildland fire, mechanical thinning, or prescribed burns where it is documented to reduce risk of
anomalously severe fires.”); J.E. HALOFSKY & D.L. PETERSON, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE AT
OLYMPIC NATIONAL FOREST AND OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK, PNW-GTR-844 (AUG. 2011); Thomas A.
Spies et al., Challenges and a Checklist for Biodiversity Conservation in Fire-Prone Forests: Perspectives
from the Pacific Northwest of USA and Southern Australia, 145 BIO. CONSERV. 5 (Jan. 2012) (discussing
“options for dealing with fire”).
44. See, e.g., BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 12 (“Fireresistant tree species that may have had their natural fire frequencies suppressed include giant sequoias
(Sequoia giganteum) in Yosemite, Sequoia, and Kings Canyon National Parks; ponderosa pine (Pinus
ponderosa) in Grand Canyon and other southwestern parks; and southwestern white pine (Pinus
strobiformis) in Guadalupe Mountains National Park. In other areas, such as Yellowstone or the subalpine
forests of Rocky Mountain National Park . . . fires are driven almost completely by historically infrequent
weather events and post-fire forest regrowth (Romme and Despain, 1989). Recent land use or fire
suppression have had little effect on fire regimes in the latter parks.”).
45. See, e.g., PETERSON ET AL., GUIDEBOOK FOR DEVELOPING ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 29,
at 76; Reed F. Noss et al., Managing Fire-Prone Forests in the Western United States, 4 FRONTIERS IN
ECOLOGY & ENV’T 481, 483 (2006). For example, in response to the increase in insect and disease
epidemics, managers and scientists may propose treatments for direct control of pests like mountain pine
beetles, including single tree or small patch removal, prescribed burns, or application of pesticides. See
Diana L. Six et al., Management for Mountain Pine Beetle Outbreak Suppression: Does Relevant Science
Support Current Policy?, 5 FORESTS 103, 112 (2014) (noting serious questions about the effectiveness of
some of these techniques). Scholars suggest that sanitation, chemical, and biological control treatments
for exotic tree diseases and pests may be necessary for climate change resistance and resilience in the
Boundary Waters National Park. They predict that managers may want to use pesticides to preserve
“exemplary stands” and cite an example in Shenandoah and Great Smoky National Parks where chemical
treatments have been used to save a few stands of eastern hemlock from the hemlock wooly adelgid. Lee
E. Frelich & Peter B. Reich, Wilderness Conservation in an Era of Global Warming and Invasive Species:
A Case Study from Minnesota’s Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness, 29 NAT. AREAS J. 385, 390–
91 (2009).
46. HALOFSKY & PETERSON, supra note 43, at 81.
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changing climate.47 After climate-induced disturbances, managers may prescribe
restoration treatments like erosion control48 or the planting of native vegetation or
tree species.49 Further, after disturbances in forested ecosystems, managers may also
recommend salvage logging,50 although some acknowledge this strategy may be
better suited for national forests rather than national parks.51 In response to
increasingly intense disturbances, studies suggest that it may be important to enhance
resilience of infrastructure. For example, the Park Service may propose altering road
and culvert designs to accommodate more extreme weather events or relocating
stream-adjacent roads.52
Another recommendation for near-term climate change adaptation in
national parks includes the “aggressive” prevention of non-native invasive species
establishment and treatment of successful invaders.53 Removal or control of these
species might reduce stresses on native species and ecosystems otherwise impacted
by climate change.54 Non-native invasive species eradication has been a priority of
the Park Service for several years. In 2009, now-Director Jarvis testified before
Congress that “the NPS needs to be aggressive in its actions to prevent the intrusion
of invasive species, eradicate where feasible, and control the spread when prevention
and eradication efforts fail.”55 Methods to prevent, eradicate, and control invasive
plant and animal species that may be prescribed in national parks include manual
(hand pulling and burning), chemical (pesticides), biological (the use of animals,
diseases, or fungi), and mechanical (mowing or fencing).56
47. See id.
48. See David L. Spittlehouse & Robert B. Stewart, Adaptation to Climate Change in Forest
Management, 4 B.C. J. ECOSYSTEMS & MGMT. 1, 10 (2003).
49. See, e.g., BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 29; V.H.
Dale. et al., Climate Change and Forest Disturbances, 51 BIOSCI. 723, 730–31 (2001).
50. See, e.g., LINDA A. JOYCE ET AL., NATIONAL FORESTS. ADAPTATION OPTIONS FOR CLIMATESENSITIVE ECOSYSTEMS AND RESOURCES 22 (2008), http://downloads.globalchange.gov/sap/sap4-4/sap44-final-report-Ch3-Forests.pdf (prescribing salvage harvesting in national forests as a climate change
response strategy: “Erosion and sediment loss following disturbances could be addressed by promptly
reforesting affected areas and salvage-harvesting affected trees (where this activity will not cause further
damage), so that a new forest canopy can be established before shrubs ‘capture’ the site.’”). There is
extensive controversy about the impacts and effectiveness of salvage logging. See Dale et al., supra note
49, at 730 (noting that salvage operations can cause erosion).
51. Compare JOYCE ET AL., supra note 50 (discussing salvage logging as a climate change response
strategy in national forests) with BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36
(no similar discussion).
52. See HALOFSKY & PETERSON, supra note 43, at 28, 32, 35–38.
53. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 22 (“If invasive
insects, either native or alien, are considered a threat to structures or the survival of valued flora, they may
be treated aggressively. Direct management interventions include use of biocides, biological control, and
plant removal in ‘front country’ areas where safety and visitor perception are paramount. Non-native
diseases are another major threat to native plants and animals. White pine blister rust (Cronartium
ribicola), for instance, has caused die-offs of five-needled pines in western and Midwestern parks.”); id.
at 29 (“[A]ggressively prevent establishment of invasive non-native species where they are documented
to threaten native species or current ecosystem function.”).
54. Long & Biber, supra note 22, at 653.
55. JARVIS TESTIMONY, supra note 1.
56. See e.g., INVASIVE SPECIES MANAGEMENT, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.
nature.nps.gov/biology/invasivespecies; Control Mechanisms, USDA (Oct. 3, 2015), http://www.invasive
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Adaptation options also include intensive management actions to protect
remnant populations of at-risk species and their refugia.57 For example, one study
discusses “keeping an endangered plant population healthy by drip irrigation” as a
climate change adaptation strategy that could help reduce environmental stress and
facilitate restoration.58 Despite its cost, managers have even discussed the possibility
of watering giant sequoias in California’s southern Sierra Nevada.59 If managing for
species persistence proves ineffective, captive breeding or propagation and
reintroduction of wildlife species may be suggested for climate change adaptation.60
B. Adaptation Actions for the Long Term
Over the long term, climate change may push certain ecosystems and
species beyond their capacity to recover. Where managing to support resilience
becomes infeasible, adaptation may require “managing transitions to new ecosystem
states.”61
Examples proposed for national parks include allowing the establishment
of species that are not present locally, but managers believe would enhance
biodiversity and regional ecosystem function.62 This may require changing Park
Service policies, for example, by relaxing the definition of invasive species.63
Similarly, national park managers may replant or introduce desired species
after disturbances or in anticipation of the loss of some species.64 For example,
scientists are identifying salt-tolerant varieties of coastal bald cypress to help restore
cypress forests now dying due to saltwater intrusion in estuaries along the Gulf and
southern Atlantic coasts.65 Where species are unable to migrate at a fast enough pace
speciesinfo.gov/toolkit/ controlmech.shtml; Erica S. Zavaleta et al., Viewing Invasive Species Removal in
a Whole-Ecosystem Context, 16 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 454, 454 (2001); WIS. DEP’T OF
NAT’L RES., INVASIVE SPECIES CONTROL METHODS, dnr.wi.gov/topic/invasives/control.html (last visited
Mar. 8, 2015).
57. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 29.
58. Stephenson & Millar, PARK SCI., supra note 35, at 36.
59. Tracie Cone, Should Giant Sequoias be Watered? Scientists Ponder Impacts of Climate Change
Across Sierra, ASSOC. PRESS (July 1, 2013), http://news.yahoo.com/giant-sequoiaswatered-scientistsponder-impacts-climate-change-152854760.html.
60. Mawdsley et al., supra note 30, at 1084–85. The Park Service has a history of reintroducing
certain species. For example, wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone National Park beginning in the
mid-1990s. See NAT’L PARK SERV., YELLOWSTONE NATIONAL PARK WOLF PROJECT ANNUAL REPORT 5
(2013). More recently, in 2007, a coalition of agencies initiated a fisher reintroduction project in
Washington state. See Olympic Peninsula Audubon Society, Olympic Fisher Reintroduction Project,
OLYMPIC PENINSULA AUDUBON SOCIETY, available at http://olympicpeninsulaaudubon.org/
conservation/olympic-fisher-reintroduction-project/ (last visited Dec. 18, 2015).
61. West et al., U.S. Natural Resources and Climate Change: Concepts and Approaches for
Management Adaptation, 44 ENVTL. MGMT. 1001, 1001 (2009).
62. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 29 (“Allow the
establishment of species that are non-native locally, but maintain native biodiversity or enhance ecosystem
function in the overall region.”).
63. See Alejandro E. Camacho, Assisted Migration: Redefining Nature and Natural Resource Law
under Climate Change, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 252 (2010).
64. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 29.
65. Unnatural Disaster: Global Warming and Our National Parks, NAT’L PARKS CONSERVATION
ASSN., http://www.npca.org/protecting-our-parks/air-land-water/climate-change/unnatural-disaster.html.
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to keep up with shifts in suitable habitat, managers may prescribe assisted
migration—the physical moving of species from native habitat to more suitable
habitat.66 Managers may “even consider conceding the loss of [a] species” where
intensive management cannot guarantee the persistence of a species.67
These long-term adaptation actions will likely generate significantly more
controversy than near-term actions when proposed in national parks. The next
section explores whether the Organic Act and individual park enabling legislation
provide for the full range of climate change adaptation actions already mentioned
here and elsewhere in the adaptation and management literature.
III. THE ORGANIC ACT AND PARK ENABLING ACTS PROVIDE
SUBSTANTIAL LEEWAY FOR PARK SERVICE MANAGEMENT
CHOICES
Given the wide range of management options that the Park Service could
employ in order to address climate change, what kind of leeway does the Organic
Act provide in making those choices? To answer that question, we begin with the
language of the Organic Act itself. As our analysis clarifies, the statutory language
provides little traction. The legislative history of the Organic Act (the debates
surrounding its enactment in Congress and more broadly) offers little useful
information. Next, we consider the history of the Park Service’s implementation of
the Organic Act, perhaps in implementing the law, the Park Service might have
identified fundamental constraints that the law imposes on management choices.
However, the significant changes in the Park Service’s position over the years gives
little basis to conclude that the Organic Act really does constrain management
choices in a significant way. We also examine the possible constraints that parkspecific enabling acts might impose on Park Service management choices; these are
relatively minimal. Lastly, we examine the case law in which courts considering
challenges to Park Service management decisions have interpreted the meaning of
both the Organic Act and park-specific enabling acts. The courts have interpreted
these laws to give wide discretion to the Park Service in making management
decisions.
A. The Text of the Organic Act
The most important component of the Organic Act, in terms of providing
guidance for Park Service management decisions, is the first section of the law:
The . . . Service . . . shall promote and regulate the use of the
National Park by means and measures that conform to the
fundamental purpose of the System units, which purpose is to
conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in
the System units and to provide for the enjoyment of the scenery,

66. Stephenson & Millar, PARK SCI., supra note 35, at 36; BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS
ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 24, 29; Frelich & Reich, supra note 45, at 391 (suggesting that
assisted migration within and around the Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness may be desirable for
climate change adaptation).
67. BARON ET AL., NATIONAL PARKS ADAPTATION OPTIONS, supra note 36, at 32.
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natural and historic objects, and wild life in such manner and by
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations.68
As many commentators have noted, this language appears to set up two goals the
Park Service is required to pursue: conserve park resources while providing for their
enjoyment, and ensure that all park resources are left “unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations.”69
The dual goals of the Organic Act appear to be in tension—after all,
providing for enjoyment may require actions (e.g., construction of trails, roads, or
hotels) that are in conflict with conserving natural resources (e.g., destruction of
natural habitat in the process of constructing trails, roads, or hotels). In resolving that
tension, the Park Service has both emphasized the Organic Act’s non-impairment
mandate and concluded that conservation trumps facilitating recreation where
conflicts exist.70
Framing the interpretive problem this way, however, just forces us to define
the terms “conserve” and “unimpaired”—terms the statute itself does not define.71
Conserve and unimpaired cannot mean a complete prohibition on all human activity
within the parks—at least, no scholar or manager has argued that position. Thus,
there must be some level of development or human impact that is permissible within
the parks that is consistent with leaving natural resources unimpaired. What, then,
do the terms “conserve” and “unimpaired” require? Do they require maintenance of
historic baseline conditions in park units, perhaps as they existed before European
contact? Do they require protecting ecosystems and species to ensure their future
survival?
Which resources are we supposed to be conserving and avoiding the
impairment of? The statute speaks of “the scenery, natural and historic objects, and
68. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014) (“The
Service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the Federal areas known as national parks,
monuments, and reservations hereinafter specified . . . as provided by law, by such means and measures
as conform to the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reservations, which purpose is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment
of future generations.”)).
69. See, e.g., Federico Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service:
Paradoxical Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74 DENV. U. L.
REV. 625, 634, 638 (1997); Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: ‘A Contradictory
Mandate’? 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 583–84, 610 (1997); John Copeland Nagle, How National Park Law
Really Works, 86 UNIV. COLO. L. REV. 861 (2015).
70. See NAT’L PARK SERV., MANAGEMENT POLICIES 2006 [hereinafter NPS MANAGEMENT
POLICIES]; see also Robert B. Keiter, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: Law, Policy, and Science
in a Dynamic Environment, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 649, 675–76 (1997) (stating that the Organic Act,
together with 1978 amendments has been interpreted by courts to “clearly give . . . primacy to resource
preservation over competing uses or interests”); Keiter, Revisiting the Organic Act, supra note 6, at 243
(same); Dennis J. Herman, Loving Them to Death: Legal Controls on the Type and Scale of Development
in the National Parks, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L. J. 3, 18 (1992). But see Nagle, supra note 69, at 861 (while
impairment does constrain NPS decision-making, conservation and recreation are equal goals under the
Organic Act).
71. See Nagle, supra note 69, at n.36 (noting lack of definition of terms in the Act, and lack of any
useful contemporary definitions of the terms).
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wild life in the System units.”72 But the very breadth of those terms only adds to the
ambiguity, especially when protecting one resource might involve damaging
another. Are non-native species considered to be “wild life” that should be protected,
even if they threaten the existence of native species? If the scenery of a pine forest
is threatened by a disease that is hosted by a native plant species, is elimination of
that plant species appropriate in order to protect scenery?
In addition to the opening language in Section 1 of the Organic Act,
Congress enacted a series of specific management provisions in Section 3 of the
Organic Act. Specifically, the Park Service may “sell or dispose of timber in cases
where, in the judgment of the Secretary, the cutting of timber is required to control
attacks of insects or diseases or otherwise conserve the scenery or the natural or
historic objects in any System unit.”73 It may also “provide for the destruction of
such animals and plant life as may be detrimental to the use of any System unit.”74
Finally, the Park Service may “grant the privilege to graze livestock within a System
unit when in the Secretary’s judgment, the use is not detrimental to the primary
purpose for which the System unit was created.”75 Combined, these provisions in the
Organic Act appear to give the Park Service broad leeway to actively manage park
resources—at least so long as it can establish that active management would offset a
threat to a park’s “scenery or the natural or historic objects” (in the case of logging)
or even more broadly a threat to the “use” of a park (in the case of controlling animal
or plant life).
In 1970 and 1978, Congress amended the Organic Act to state that all units
are part of “one National Park System,” that all areas in the system are to be managed
“consistent with and founded in the purpose” of Section 1 of the Organic Act, and
that all activities in the park system “shall be conducted in light of the high public
value and integrity of the System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the
values and purposes for which the System units have been established, except as
directed and specifically provided by Congress.”76 As noted below, these provisions
are generally understood to restate the basic principles of Section 1 of the Organic
Act.77
72. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014) (discussing
“the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein”)).
73. 54 U.S.C. § 100753 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014) (permitting
the Park Service to “sell or dispose of timber in those cases where in [the Secretary’s] judgment the cutting
of such timber is required in order to control the attacks of insects or diseases or otherwise conserve the
scenery or the natural or historic objects”)).
74. 54 U.S.C. § 100752 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014) (allowing it
to “provide in [its] discretion for the destruction of such animals and of such plant life as may be
detrimental to the use of any of said parks, monuments, or reservations”)).
75. 54 U.S.C. § 102101(a)(2) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014)
(permitting the Park Service to “grant the privilege to graze livestock within any national park, monument,
or reservation herein referred to when in his judgment such use is not detrimental to the primary purpose
for which such park, monument, or reservation was created”)).
76. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(b)(1), (2) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (repealed 2014)
(as enacted by Pub. L. 91-383, § 1, Aug. 18, 1970, 84 Stat. 825 and amended by Pub. L. 95-250, title I, §
101(b), Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 166) (stating that all activities in the park system “shall be conducted in
light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park System and shall not be exercised in
derogation of the values and purposes for which these various areas have been established”)).
77. See infra notes 170, 179, 241 and accompanying text.
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In the context of management actions to respond to climate change, the
statutory language does not appear to impose many constraints.78 Even the most
aggressive management choices could plausibly be framed within the scope of the
broad tripartite framework of Section 1. If the management action can be framed as
a response to the human impacts caused by climate change (e.g., an effort to offset
those impacts), then the action might be characterized as an action to “conserve” a
park’s natural resources in a way that ensures it remains “unimpaired” by climate
change. Reciprocally, passive management allows park ecosystems to change in
response to climate change; this management style could be framed as an appropriate
choice to “conserve” the natural resources by avoiding the “impairment” that might
result from active management.
The provisions in Section 3 appear to add to the Park Service’s discretion
under the Organic Act.79 Indeed, they seem to further facilitate the ability of the Park
Service to pursue active management, if it opts to do so.80 After all, climate change
can be framed as a threat to the “scenery or the natural or historic objects” of the park
system, and as a threat to the “use” of the park. For instance, climate change might
facilitate the expansion of native pine beetles into new habitats; this would cause
significant mortality in pine forests—threatening the “scenery” as well as the
“natural objects” of the park system. Pine forest mortality could also be plausibly
framed as a threat to the “use” of the park—for instance, because dead trees are less
scenic, or because dead trees might fall onto visitors using roads or trails. Thus,
logging or other removal of animal or plant life in response to climate change is
plausibly justifiable under Section 3.
B. Legislative History of the Organic Act
When faced with unclear or ambiguous statutory language, a traditional tool
of lawyers and judges to interpret that language is to examine the history of the law’s
enactment, to determine whether the intent of the legislature can be further
elucidated.81 However, there is little evidence from the enactment of the Organic Act
that helps to interpret its extremely broad language.
Several scholars—including a leading historian—have attempted to parse
the legislative history of the Organic Act to glean additional clarity from the language

78. Molly N. Ross, The Requirement to Leave Park Resources and Values “Unimpaired”, 30
GEORGE WRIGHT F. 67, 68 (2013) (noting that the terms in the statute are “not entirely plain and the
words’ essential ambiguities provide fertile ground for evolution of meaning with increasing knowledge
and changing circumstances”); Cheever, supra note 69, at 634, 638 (arguing that the Organic Act gives
the agency wide discretion, even “carte blanche” to operate as it sees fit).
79. See 54 U.S.C. §§ 100752, 100753 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed
2014)).
80. Id.
81. See JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS 127–28 (2d ed. 2013). This technique is not without controversy among lawyers and
judges. For instance, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia has repeatedly argued that legislative
history is not an appropriate tool to use to interpret statutes. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of Section 1. Those efforts have failed,82 even when the search extended beyond the
traditional legislative history tools of congressional statements, or official reports by
congressional committees, and extended into the personal papers of individuals
(whether legislators or not) who were influential in drafting the Organic Act.83 If any
lesson can be drawn from the Organic Act’s legislative history, it is probably that
Congress intended the Park Service to have broad discretion to protect the scenic
nature of its lands, and prioritize protection of scenery over other goals (such as
commercial timber harvesting);84 Congress did not envision tight controls over Park
Service decision-making.85
82. Ross, supra note 78, at 69–70 (stating that there is little information in legislative history on
meaning of “unimpaired” in Organic Act); Keiter, Revisiting the Organic Act, supra note 6, at 241
(arguing there is little useful information about impairment language in the legislative history).
83. Historian Robin W. Winks conducted an exhaustive historical review of the papers of the leading
figures who helped draft the Act. He concluded that “[p]arks were to be held to a higher standard of
preservation because of their grandeur and (with monuments) scientific values than were other federallyadministered lands . . . and while roads, accommodations, and other man-made intrusions were necessary
in order to enhance the recreational purposes of the national parks, such physical objects were to be
subordinate to the preservation of the ‘scenery.’ Never, however, was scenery defined, for clearly all
believed they understood its meaning.” Winks, supra note 69, at 589 (providing an overview of the
legislative history and finding little detailed information to guide interpretation of the law). He believed
that there was little focus on the specific meaning of the conservation or non-impairment mandates in the
Organic Act. Id. at 583–84. Winks ultimately argued that based on principles of rhetoric, conservation is
first-mentioned in the statute and therefore the most important component of the Organic Act mandate.
Id. at 610.
84. Testimony before Congress on various versions of the Organic Act between 1912 and 1916
emphasized how the Park Service was to be very different from the Forest Service, with the Park Service
focused on protection of scenery and the Forest Service focused on timber production. For example, in a
letter the Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, emphasized the difference between national forests and
national parks, namely that national forests “should be managed with a view to their fullest possible
development and use, in order that the industries dependent upon them may secure necessary supplies”
while, on the other hand, “the national parks should be managed with a view to preserving their scenic
interest and furnishing a recreation ground for the people, only allowing such use of their resources as
may be necessary to improve and protect them.” Establishment of a National Park Service: Hearing on
H.R. 22995 Before the H. Comm. on the Public Lands, 62nd Cong. 5 (1912); see also National Park
Service: Hearing on H.R. 434 and H.R. 8668 Before the H. Comm. on the Public Lands, 64th Cong. 52–
53 (1916) (statement of J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Association) (stating that
the parks were the “Nation’s pleasure grounds and the Nation’s restoring places” while the forests were
“the nation’s wood lots” and that national parks needed to be “dignified by a separate handling” in order
to be “freer from the assaults of selfishness”); id. at 43–44 (stating that because the parks were free of
“public lumbering” and “protected by law from hunting of any kind,” they alone “had the seclusion and
other conditions essential for the protection and propagation of wild animal life” and would become “great
public nature schools”). There is one significant reference in the legislative history of the Organic Act that
can be seen as identifying a historic baseline as the reference point for conservation. H.R. Rep. No. 64700, at 3 (1916) (The House Report for the Act stated that “segregation of national park[s]” required “the
preservation of nature as it exists.”).
85. Winks, supra note 69, at 646 (summarizing the relevant legislative history). See also RICHARD
WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY 29, 40–45 (2d ed. 2009)
(“The legislative history of the Organic Act provides no evidence that either Congress or those who
lobbied for the act sought a mandate for an exacting preservation of natural conditions. An examination
of the motivations and perceptions of the Park Service’s founders reveals that their principal concerns
were the preservation of scenery, the economic benefits of tourism, and efficient management of the
parks.”); Nagle, supra note 69, at 890 (stating that the goals of conservation and recreation are equal under
the Organic Act, and that this is evident in the enabling acts for parks created before the Organic Act, and
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Thus, the Act’s legislative history reinforces our initial analysis that the text
of the statute allows for broad discretion by the Park Service to use a wide variety of
management tools to respond to climate change.
C. Park Service Implementation of the Organic Act
Does the history of Park Service implementation of the Organic Act shed
any light on the meaning of the statutory language? Note that here we are not directly
interested in how the Park Service may or may not have constrained itself through
its current policy documents interpreting the meaning of the Organic Act. Instead,
we are interested in whether the Park Service’s interpretation of the Organic Act is
so consistent over time and reflects such a uniform understanding of the Organic Act,
that this might be seen as relevant evidence as to a consensus—at least in practice—
about the meaning of the Organic Act’s language.
From a legal perspective, interpretations by agencies of the statutes they
implement can have some bearing on a court’s interpretation of the relevant statutory
language. If Congress has (explicitly or implicitly) delegated to an agency the power
to interpret statutory language, the relevant statutory language is ambiguous, and the
agency’s interpretation of that statutory language is embodied in an administrative
decision that meets certain procedural requirements, then courts will ordinarily defer
to a reasonable agency interpretation of the statutory language.86 This is called
“Chevron deference,” after the Supreme Court case that articulated the rationale and
standards for this form of deference.87 However, it is important to remember that an
agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language is not irreversible—in other
words, the agency may later change its interpretation, and if appropriate procedural
steps are again followed, the courts will defer to that alternate statutory interpretation
as well, so long as it is reasonable.88
However, there may be agency interpretations of a statute that identify clear,
outer limits to the permissible range of interpretations of ambiguous statutory
language. Occasionally, courts have drawn upon agency practice in interpreting
ambiguous statutory language, even when that agency practice does not meet the
procedural requirements necessary for Chevron deference.89 In applying this
alternative deferential standard, courts may consider the agency’s history of statutory
interpretation when they believe that the agency has expertise in interpreting the

this creates broad discretion for Park Service to balance those two goals); but see Herman, supra note 70,
at 21 (arguing that early park enabling legislation prioritized conservation goal).
86. See Chevron v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984). For Supreme Court case
law articulating the procedural requirements that agencies might need to fulfill such that their statutory
interpretation would receive judicial deference, see U. S. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001)
(stating that courts have consistently granted deference to agency decisions that have gone through public
notice and comment).
87. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44.
88. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996) (agencies can revise their
interpretation of a statute and still receive deference, so long as the change in position is adequately
explained); see also Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–64.
89. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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statute and has been consistent over an extended period of time.90 Note that in
applying this alternative deferential standard (sometimes called “Skidmore
deference”), courts defer much less to the agency interpretation than they would
under Chevron. Rather, the courts weigh the agency interpretation as part of its
overall, independent determination of the meaning of the statute.91 After applying
Skidmore deference, it is possible that the court’s interpretation of the statute might
be fixed—i.e., that other alternative interpretations of the statute would be
foreclosed—if the court concludes that the meaning of the statute (as informed by
prior administrative interpretations) is clear.92
Thus, the question is whether the Park Service’s interpretation of the
meaning of the relevant provisions of the Organic Act has been so clear and
consistent over time that courts might take that interpretation as relevant to
determining the fixed meaning of the statute. In other words, can that history resolve
(some, maybe all) ambiguity over the meaning of the statute in a permanent way (at
least unless Congress amends the statute)?93
There is a long and rich history of Park Service implementation of the
Organic Act with respect to the management of park resources, including wildlife
and forest ecosystems. However, it is clear that Park Service implementation of the
Organic Act is not sufficiently consistent over time to lead a court to conclude that
the Organic Act’s ambiguous terms (“conserve” and “unimpaired”) should be fixed
by particular meanings.
Although the Park Service generally defined its mission under the Organic
Act as consistently protecting what is “natural” about the parks, its definition of
“naturalness,” and how to appropriately achieve it, has not been consistent.94 The
90. See id. (Courts will look to agency interpretations of statutes to assist in judicial interpretation of
the statute to the extent that the agency interpretation shows “thoroughness evident in its consideration . . .
validity in its reasoning . . . consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade.”).
91. For a discussion of the extent to which the courts are deferring to agencies or reaching their own
independent judgment about the statute in the context of Skidmore deference, see KRISTIN E. HICKMAN
& RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 644–45 (2010).
92. However, if the court concludes that the relevant provision of the statute is ambiguous, and
develops its own interpretation of the statute based on agency interpretations, the agency still has the
possibility of interpreting the statute and receiving Chevron deference, so long as (again) the interpretation
is reasonable and the agency interpretation meets minimum procedural requirements. See Nat’l Cable &
Telecom Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005).
93. We take as given that courts would consider the Park Service to have sufficient expertise in the
management areas covered by the Organic Act and that the agency’s interpretation should be given some
weight under Skidmore. See Skidmore, 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
94. See SELLARS, supra note 85, at 27 (“Although extensive manipulation and intrusion took place
in the parks, fundamentally the national park idea embraced the concept of nurturing and protecting
nature.”); One of the earliest policy documents in the agency’s history, the Lane Letter, which is seen as
one of the most important documents in setting the agency’s direction, explicitly calls for maintaining
parks in their “natural state.” Letter from Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to Stephen T. Mather,
Director of National Park Service (May 13, 1918), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM:
THE CRITICAL DOCUMENTS 48, 48 (Lary M. Dilsaver ed., 1994) [hereinafter AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK
SYSTEM] (“Every activity of the Service is subordinate to the duties imposed upon it to faithfully preserve
the parks for posterity in essentially their natural state.”); see also Memorandum from Hubert Work,
Secretary of the Interior, for Director, National Park Service (March 11, 1925), reprinted in AMERICA’S
NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 62 (stating one key principle for NPS is “that the national
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Park Service has taken neither a passive nor an active approach to management,
consistently, nor has it consistently managed park ecosystems to achieve a particular
historic baseline. Early in the Park Service’s implementation of the Organic Act,
under the leadership of its inaugural Director, Stephen Mather, the Park Service
utilized significant active management steps to facilitate visitor enjoyment of the
scenic elements of the park—both living and nonliving.95 For instance, Park Service
policy from the 1920s through the 1940s allowed logging and pesticides to control
beetle and fungus infestations in scenic areas within the parks96— including active
fire suppression97 and salvage logging in a protected research area in Great Smoky
Mountains National Park.98
parks and national monuments must be maintained untouched by the inroad of modern civilization in
order that unspoiled bits of native America may be preserved by future generations as well as our own”);
Newton B. Drury, The National Parks in Wartime, reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, at
167, 173 (parks are places “where forests continue to evolve normally, where animal life remains in
harmonious relationship to its environment, and where the ways of nature and its works may still be
studied in the original design.”).
95. See, e.g., SELLARS, supra note 85, at 88 (stating the goals of active management in the 1920s
focused on utilitarian promotion of scenery); id. at 89 (“During Mather’s time [the 1920s] the Service
seemed to define an unimpaired national park as a carefully and properly developed park.”); Lary M.
Dilsaver, The New Deal Years: 1933–1941, in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at
112 (in 1930s, NPS management focused on “visual and experiential scenes and the inspiration they
provided as the highest preservation targets.”); John R. White, Atmosphere in the National Parks,
reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM., supra note 94, at 142 (In the 1930s, John R. White,
who was superintendent of Sequoia National Park, wrote an influential document, Atmosphere in the
National Parks, in which he said that most important problem for park management is “the preservation
or the infusion of the right atmosphere.”).
96. See, e.g., SELLARS, supra note 85, at 83–84, 130–31 (showing the National Park Service’s policy
and actions, in the 1920s and 1930s to actively manage the control of tree fungus and beetle infestations
by logging and spraying in scenic areas, but not taking actions in remote areas); NAT’L PARK SERV., A
FORESTRY POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL PARKS 89 (May 6, 1931), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL
PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 93–94 (electing policy that insect control occur in “[a]reas of intensive
use, such as camp grounds . . . [a]reas of important scenic or esthetic attraction . . . [a]reas within the
national park threatening protected areas either within or outside the national park . . . [a]reas of unusual
fire hazard . . . [and] [a]reas set aside for study or research (unless natural agencies are to be left
undisturbed)”). Letter from Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane to Stephen T. Mather, Director of
National Park Service (May 13, 1918), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94,
at 48–49 (The Lane Letter authorized the use of timber cutting “where the thinning of forests or cutting
of vistas will improve the scenic features of the parks.”). The Park Service also adopted a policy that
allowed for the elimination of native bushes that served as host for a disease affecting white pines. See,
e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., A FORESTRY POLICY FOR THE NATIONAL PARKS (May 6, 1931), reprinted in
AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 89, 96 (to control tree diseases should consider
removal of currant and gooseberry bushes to protect white pines); Horace M. Albright, Research in the
National Parks (June 1933), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 122, 129
(proposing elimination of host plants for white pine blister rust in parks).
97. See, e.g., SELLARS, supra note 85, at 82–83, 127 (beginning in the 1920s, the National Park
Service actively started to suppress fires in the parks) (showing that the National Park Service’s goal in
1930s was to completely protect forests from fire). Park Service policy in the 1920s and 1930s called for
suppression of all fires if possible. See Jay H. Price, Fire Prevention Plan for the National Parks 10th
National Park Conference (Feb. 15–21, 1928), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra
note 94, at 81, 83 (best outcome of fire policy is prevention of fire, and immediate suppression of fires is
required).
98. See SELLARS, supra note 85, at 111–12 (discussing the need for salvage logging in Great Smoky
National Park in 1930s led the National Park Service to eliminate protected research area; salvage logging
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In the 1920s, the Park Service began creating zoo-like enclosures for some
large mammals so that visitors could easily observe the scenic wildlife. The Park
Service also employed active management to increase the populations of large
ungulates such as elk, including winter feeding programs and elimination of predator
species like wolves.99 Similarly, the Park Service stocked non-native fish species in
park waterways to facilitate recreational fishing.100 All of these activities continued
through the 1940s.101 Internal debate sparked within the Park Service about the
propriety of these management choices. A group of Park Service biologists led by

seen as needed to reduce fire risk). Salvage logging also occurred in Olympic National Park in response
to pressures for commercial timber production. See id. at 153–54. (stating the National Park Service in
the 1940s and early 1950s allowed active salvage of windblown timber in Olympic National Park, but the
contracts often included the cutting of healthy trees).
99. See, e.g., SELLARS, supra note 85, at 79–80 (explaining that in the 1920s, feed programs made
the bears in Yellowstone more accessible to visitors); id. at 75–76 (showing the active management of
Yellowstone bison herd, including feeding, corralling, and exporting of “surplus” animals); id. at 70–73
(providing that the National Park Service managed predators and fires to maintain large ungulate
populations and large forests as part of scenery, including actively killing predators in many parks through
1920s); id. at 158–60 (showing that wolf hunting in McKinley National Park occurred to protect sheep
populations); Nat’l Park Serv., Policy on Predatory Mammals (1931), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL
PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 87 (needing the National Park Service to protect rare wildlife by having
“fine herds of game [that] are furnished as a spectacle for the benefit of the public” and predator control
will be required, but only when threatening game “needing special protection,” otherwise “[p]redatory
animals are to be considered an integral part of the wildlife protected within national parks and no
widespread campaigns of destruction are to be countenanced”); KEITER, TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED,
supra note, 37, at 17, 175–76 (discussing examples of early NPS active management, such as wolf and
other predator eradication and bear and bison feeding and corrals). Official public feeding of bears in
Yellowstone did not end until the 1940s. See SELLARS, supra note 85, at 160–62.
100. See SELLARS, supra note 85, at 80–81 (showing the most extensive management was of fish
populations, including stocking of non-native fish species in many national parks to facilitate recreational
fishing throughout the 1920s). Non-native fish stocking by the Park Service gradually disappeared over a
period of decades. So in the 1930s, the Service policies allowed for non-native fish stocking only in
fishless lakes, although that policy was not always enforced. See, e.g., Horace M. Albright, Research in
the National Parks (June 1933), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 122,
126 (creating National Park Service policy for no exotic introductions into the parks “except for the
occasional stocking of an otherwise barren body of water with some species of game fish for the
enjoyment of lovers of the Waltonian sport.”); NAT’L PARK SERV., OFFICE ORDER NO. 323, FISH POLICY
149 (April 13, 1936), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 149 (discussing
the National Park Service policy specifying no introduction of exotic fish species where there are only
native species, allowing exotic fish stocking to continue where they are “best suited to the environment
and have proven of higher value for fishing purposes than native species,” but stocking will not be
continued where it “threatens extinction of native species” in a park). By the 1960s, fish stocking activities
were, under Service policy, highly restricted. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERV., WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT IN
NATIONAL PARKS (1962), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 217
(stocking fish only where reproduction is not enough to “maintain an adequate fish population to meet the
need of recreational angling”); id. at 217, 222 (allowing to only stock exotic fish “where exotic fishes are
established and the restoration of native species is impracticable” or “[w]here adequate investigations
have demonstrated that additional planting is desirable and necessary to supplement limited or nonexisting natural reproduction”); id. at 217, 223 (“Lakes and streams which are barren of fish life shall
remain in this virgin condition and shall not be stocked.”).
101. See, e.g., SELLARS, supra note 85, at 116–17, 119–23, 124–26 (showing the active management
of Yellowstone bison continuing in 1930s) (showing the predator control in parks continuing in 1930s,
especially for coyotes) (explaining that fish stocking continued in 1930s, sometimes even where native
fish species are present).
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George Wright called for management that focused on protecting pre-European
contact ecosystems and species, and a general preference for hands-off
management.102 However, even Wright acknowledged the need for occasional
hands-on management to achieve his goals: for instance, to restore native species
that had been harmed by human actions or to prevent overpopulation by native
grazing species that might harm native ecosystems.103 Although Wright was
somewhat successful in changing the Park Service’s goals and management
directions in the 1930s, many of those changes were reversed after his untimely
death.104

102. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 99–100 (noting conflict between new biologists in NPS in 1930s and
traditional wildlife management and forestry activities like predator control and insect control). Wright
produced an internal document, entitled Fauna No. 1, that laid out his vision for a Park Service that focused
on protecting healthy species and ecosystems through the use of hands-off management, where possible.
GEORGE M. WRIGHT ET AL., NAT’L PARK SERVICE, Fauna of the National Parks of the United States: A
Preliminary Survey of Faunal Relations in National Parks, Contribution of Wildlife Survey Fauna Series
No. 1, May 1932, reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM , supra note 94, at 104 [hereinafter
WRIGHT, Fauna No. 1]; id. at 105 (goal of NPS is “preserving characteristic examples of primitive
America”); id. at 110 (“any native species which has been exterminated from the park area shall be brought
back if this can be done . . . [and] any exotic species which has already become established in a park shall
be either eliminated or held to a minimum provided complete eradication is not feasible.”); id. at 109
(“every species shall be left to carry on its struggle for existence unaided, as being to its greatest ultimate
good, unless there is real cause to believe that it will perish if unassisted.”); id. (any intervention should
be calculated such that “every effort shall be made to place that species on a self-sustaining basis once
more.”); id. (predator control should only occur if a prey species “is in immediate danger of extermination,
and then only if the predator is not itself a vanishing form.”); FREDERIC H. WAGNER, ET AL., WILDLIFE
POLICIES IN THE U.S. NATIONAL PARKS 23–24 (1995) (Wright’s Fauna No. 1 report in 1933 called for
hands-off management and protection of predators and restriction or elimination of non-native species).
103. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 96–98; WRIGHT, Fauna No. 1, supra note 102, at 104, 106 (wildlife
management goal for parks is to “restore and perpetuate the fauna in its pristine state by combating the
harmful effects of human influence.”); id. at 109–110 (“the numbers of native ungulates occupying a
deteriorated range shall not be permitted to exceed its reduced carrying capacity and, preferably, shall be
kept below the carrying capacity at every step until the range can be brought back to original
productiveness.”). Wright also emphasized the need for management to facilitate public viewing of
wildlife. Id. at 109 (“one function of the national parks shall be to preserve the flora and fauna in the
primitive state and, at the same time, to provide the people with maximum opportunity for the observation
thereof.”). Some foresters at the time also argued that active management was required to maintain
“natural” forest conditions. See SELLARS, supra note 85, at 129 (NPS forester argues in 1930s that NPS
“must modify conditions to retain as nearly a natural forest condition as possible for the enjoyment of
future generations.”). A fuller quote makes clear how strongly the speaker advocated for active
management: “The parks have long since passed the time when nature can be left to itself to take care of
the area. Man has already and will continue to affect the natural conditions of the areas, and it is just as
much a part of the Service Policy to provide for their enjoyment as it is to preserve the natural conditions.
There is no longer any such thing as a balance of nature in our parks – man has modified it. We must carry
on a policy of compensatory management of the areas.” Id.
104. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 145. In the 1930s, the Park Service began to explicitly consider active
management to restore native species to parks where they were no longer present. HORACE M. ALBRIGHT,
NAT’L PARK SERVICE, supra note 96, at 126 (NPS policy providing for restocking of native species
“which has become depleted because of some unnatural condition or series of conditions” and pointing to
examples of reintroduction of bison and antelope in national parks). It is also important to recognize that
the Park Service as a matter of policy also adopted hands-off management for areas of the parks that were
remote. See, e.g., NAT’L PARK SERVICE, SUPERINTENDENTS’ RESOLUTION ON OVERDEVELOPMENT,
reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 57 (“Certain areas should be reserved

214

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 56

The success of the Park Service’s efforts to increase large ungulate
populations eventually forced a major change in the Park Service’s overall
management strategies. Wildlife managers believed elk populations in Yellowstone
National Park were well over carrying capacity, causing significant damage to the
forest ecosystem. In response, the Park Service had been culling elk populations in
large numbers in the Park for many years. Congress eventually became interested in
the topic, with some Western legislators demanding that if culling was to occur, it
should be done by the public through open hunting. The Park Service sought to avoid
this outcome—partly because of its strong philosophical objection to public hunting
in the parks. The Park Service therefore convened a panel of leading scientists and
managers to evaluate the management of the Yellowstone elk herd.105
That expert panel produced perhaps the most important management policy
document in the Park Service’s history: the 1963 Leopold Report.106 While the
Leopold Report is often seen as groundbreaking, in many ways it simply
recapitulated the management goals and strategies that George Wright advanced
three decades earlier: the goal of management should be the restoration and
maintenance of ecological conditions present at the time of European contact.107
Hands-off management is preferred if possible to achieve that goal.108 However, the
Park Service should use active management when necessary, and frequently active
management will be needed to achieve that goal.109 Indeed, the Leopold Report
in each park, with a minimum amount of development, in order that animals, forest, flowers, and all native
life shall be preserved under natural conditions.”).
105. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 196–201.
106. A.S. LEOPOLD ET AL., NAT’L PARK SERVICE, ADVISORY BD. ON WILDLIFE MGMT. APPOINTED
BY SEC’Y OF THE INTERIOR UDALL, Wildlife Management in the National Parks, March 4, 1963, reprinted
in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 237 [hereinafter LEOPOLD REPORT].
107. Id. at 239 (goal of management is to maintain or recreate “as nearly as possible . . . the condition
that prevailed when the area was first visited by the white man. A national park should represent a vignette
of primitive America.”). The Leopold Report recognized that although full restoration to historic baselines
may be impossible; nonetheless, those historic baselines might nevertheless serve as useful goals. Id. at
237 (conceding that restoring “primitive America” is not feasible in many cases, but “if the goal cannot
be fully achieved it can be approached” and a “reasonable illusion of primitive America could be
recreated” and that this “should be the objective of every national park and monument.”). A subsequent
National Academy of Sciences report reached similar conclusions. See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES-NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, A Report by the Advisory Committee to the National Park Service on Research,
1963, reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 253 (goal of NPS is the
“preservation of nature in the national parks, the maintenance of natural conditions, and the avoidance of
artificiality.”).
108. LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 106, at 239 (“There is no need for active modification to maintain
large examples of the relatively stable ‘climax’ communities which under protection perpetuate
themselves indefinitely.”). For instance the Leopold Report questioned the use of insecticides in parks
and called for allowing greater use of fire in the parks. Id. at 244–45. See also NAT’L PARK SERVICE,
Wildlife Management in National Parks, reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note
94, at 217, 219 (only intervene with indigenous animals when “essential to the maintenance of populations
and their natural environments in a healthy condition.”).
109. “[M]ost biotic communities are in a constant state of change due to natural or man-caused
processes of ecological succession. In these ‘successional’ communities it is necessary to manage the
habitat to achieve or stabilize it at a desired stage.” LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 106, at 239; see also
SELLARS, supra note 85, at 243–46 (Leopold Report calls for active management in service of restoring
natural conditions, allows for large mammal culling and fishing); see LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 106,
at 237 (stating that “protection, though it is important, is not of itself a substitute for habitat,” that habitat
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indicated that culling of the Yellowstone elk herd might be necessary on an ongoing
basis because “the national parks were ‘too small in area to be relegated to the forces
of nature that shaped a continent.’”110 Nonetheless, primarily in response to political
pressure, the Park Service ended culling of the elk herd in 1967, justifying its
decision on the grounds that “natural regulation” could maintain the elk herd
numbers within appropriate limits.111
After the Leopold Report, the Park Service generally moved to a different
paradigm from its first fifty years of management: for ecological management
questions, the Park Service would seek to achieve pre-Columbian ecosystem
characteristics112—preferring hands-off management113—but using active
management when necessary to offset human impacts on parks, and to maintain and
restore native species and ecosystems in parks that have become “islands”
surrounded by human development.114 Current Park Service policy is more or less

and biotic communities change, and that “purposeful management of plant and animal communities” is
“an essential step in preserving wildlife resources”); id. at 240 (noting that many national parks had major
human interventions or impacts and that active intervention will be needed to undo those impacts); id. at
241–42 (active management will be required to maintain “successional communities that were maintained
by fires, floods, hurricanes and other natural forces.”); see also NAT’L PARK SERV., WILDLIFE
MANAGEMENT IN NATIONAL PARKS (1962), reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra
note 94, at 219–20 (restating Fauna No. 1 prescriptions on exotics, predators, intervention with native
species, and keeping ungulates below carrying capacity); NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES-NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, A Report by the Advisory Committee to the National Park Service on Research, 1963, reprinted
in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 253–54 (“control and guidance” of
“evolutionary processes” in parks may be necessary to preserve the “unique features” of parks); KEITER,
TO CONSERVE UNIMPAIRED, supra note 37, at 179–80 (noting importance of Leopold Report, which
called for active management focused on restoring pre-Columbian status of ecosystems, and its adoption
by NPS shortly thereafter).
110. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 248–49; see also LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 106, at 246–49 (noting
need for artificial control of ungulate populations to maintain carrying capacity, including elk herd in
Yellowstone).
111. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 246–47.
112. See, e.g., U.S. NAT’L PARK SERV., NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21st CENTURY: THE VAIL
AGENDA: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE FROM
THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF THE 75th ANNIVERSARY SYMPOSIUM 104 (1992) (NPS management
“requires the maintenance or restoration of native ecosystems and resistance to the establishment of alien
organisms. Where possible, ecosystem management should attempt to preserve natural processes,
operating at a scale consistent with the evolution of the ecosystem being managed.”); WAGNER ET AL.,
supra note 102, at 16–17 (current NPS policy goal is to preserve “‘intact’ or ‘healthy’ ecosystems in some
degree similar to the pre-Columbian state,” and a secondary goal has to been to protect endangered species
and historic landscapes).
113. WAGNER ET AL., supra note 102, at 36 (1988 NPS policy calls for hands-off management except
for ecosystem restoration, at the direction of Congress, or in emergencies threatening human life and
property).
114. For instance, Park Service policies adopted shortly after the Leopold Report called for the use of
active management, where necessary, to maintain historic ecosystems:
In earlier times, the establishment of a park and the protection of its forests and wildlife
from careless disturbance were sufficient to insure its preservation as a natural area.
The impact of man on the natural scene was negligible since the parks were surrounded
by vast undeveloped lands, and there were comparatively few visitors. This condition
prevails no more, for the parks are fast becoming islands of primitive America,
increasingly influenced by resource use practices around their borders, and by the
impact of increasing millions of visitors. Passive protection is not enough. Active
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consonant with the Leopold Report. Its goal is to maintain and restore natural
conditions in the parks wherever possible,115 using hands-off management to achieve
those goals as much as possible, while recognizing the necessity of active
management to achieve the Park Service’s goals.116
It is this current paradigm that is the basis for critiques of Park Service
policy as untenable in the face of climate change. Critics argue that hands-off
management will not maintain historic ecosystem baseline conditions in many cases.
Rather, critics suggest that to maintain those conditions, active management will
frequently require heroic efforts that are unrealistically expensive, fundamentally
undermine the natural appearance of national parks, and potentially have
counterproductive impacts that harm other species and ecosystem components.117
Given this tension, these critics have called for the Park Service to reconsider historic
management of the natural environment, plus a sensitive application of discipline in
park planning, use, and development are requirements for today.
NAT’L PARK SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR NATURAL AREAS, 1968, reprinted in AMERICA’S
NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 354; see also id. (calling for the “application of ecological
management techniques to neutralize the unnatural influences of man, thus permitting the natural
environment to be maintained essentially by nature”); WAGNER ET AL., supra note 102, at 26–27, 32–33
(Leopold Report allows for and called for active management based on a goal of historic conditions, NPS
policy in 1968 quickly changed to adopt Leopold Report proposals). This policy included the use of native
species reintroductions, logging to control insects and disease, and natural and prescribed fire. NAT’L
PARK SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES FOR NATURAL AREAS, 1968, reprinted in AMERICA’S
NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 354–55. The transition took time. The agency continued both
fire suppression and active insect control using spraying into the early 1970s. By the end of the decade,
the agency had moved to integrated pest management (relying much less on spraying) and adopted
prescribed burns and allowing wild fires to burn in certain circumstances. SELLARS, supra note 85, at 254–
57.
115. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 4 (NPS “will strive to understand, maintain,
restore, and protect the inherent integrity of the natural resources, processes, systems, and values of the
parks.”); id. at § 4.1 (stating that agency is to “preserv[e] [park] components and processes in their natural
condition”); id. at § 4.1.5 (NPS “will reestablish natural functions and processes in parks unless otherwise
directed by Congress,” will not conduct restoration in response to natural disturbances, but will respond
to impacts “resulting from human disturbances.”); id. at § 4.4.2.4 (same); id. at § 4.4.1 (NPS “will maintain
as parts of the natural ecosystems of parks all plants and animals native to park ecosystems” including
restoring extirpated populations); id. at §§ 4.4.1.1, 4.4.1.2 (agency will maintain natural wildlife
population dynamics and genetic diversity); id. at § 4.4.4.2 (agency will remove non-native species where
feasible); id. at § 4.4.5.1 (agency will generally not control native pests); id. at § 4 (defining “natural
condition” as “the condition of resources that would occur in the absence of human dominance over the
landscape”).
116. See id. at § 4.1 (agency “will not intervene in natural biological or physical processes” unless
legally mandated to do so, to respond to emergencies threatening “human life and property” and “to restore
natural ecosystem functioning that has been disrupted by past of ongoing human activities”) (agency will
limits its management “to the minimum necessary to achieve the stated management objectives,” but
recognizes that active management may often be needed to restore resources); see also id. at § 4.4.2
(“Whenever possible, natural processes will be relied upon to maintain native plant and animal species.”)
(stating that any intervention must not cause unacceptable impacts and will be undertaken either to protect
human lives, property, safety, or to offset human impacts on a species, or to protect an endangered
species).
117. See, e.g., Gregory H. Aplet & David N. Cole, The Trouble With Naturalness: Rethinking Park
and Wilderness Goals, in BEYOND NATURALNESS: PARK AND WILDERNESS STEWARDSHIP IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE 12 (David N. Cole & Laurie Yung eds., 2010); Cole & Yung, supra note 24, at 8; Tweed,
An Idea In Trouble, supra note 5, at 6, 8; Joly, supra note 10, at 45; TWEED, UNCERTAIN PATH, supra
note 4, at 201.

Winter 2016

THE NPS ORGANIC ACT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

217

baselines as a goal and hands-off management as a primary management tool,118 as
part of a broader reexamination of what it means to be natural in the context of
protected area management.119
As this brief history makes clear, the Park Service’s own policies have not
consistently adopted this particular paradigm as a necessary implication of the
Organic Act’s language. There has been consistency in the questions with which the
Park Service has wrestled: how much to rely on active versus passive management;
should the goals of conservation and non-impairment focus on maintaining or
recreating historic baselines of species and ecosystem conditions; or should it instead
facilitate human observation and enjoyment of spectacular natural scenery. Although
Park Service policy has trended toward managing for historic baselines120 (although
even here there is variation over time),121 the Park Service has always adopted a mix
of hands-on and hands-off management approaches, seeing both as consistent with
its statutory mandate. Of course, which specific management approaches are seen as
consistent with the statutory mandate has varied substantially over time. For
example, non-native fish stocking was once a well-accepted management tool; now
it is strongly discouraged in national parks.122
If a court fully considered this history of Park Service implementation of
the Organic Act, it would not and could not conclude that the Park Service
118. Joly, supra note 10, at 45 (calling for “major regulatory reinterpretation at the agency level” to
move away from focus on historical conditions); TWEED, UNCERTAIN PATH, supra note 4, at 34 (stating
that “NPS policies explicitly state that park ecosystems will be preserved through the protection and
perpetuation of natural processes” but questioning whether this is feasible in a future of climate change).
Some of the calls for more NPS use of active management precede the recent debates over the implications
of climate change. WAGNER ET AL., supra note 102, at 168–69, 178 (arguing for need for active
management to maintain healthy ecosystems and calling for revision of NPS policies and implementation
accordingly). But see Keiter, Preserving Nature, supra note 70, at 666–74 (arguing that current NPS
policies are consistent with responding to widespread human impacts on natural systems).
119. Daniel N. Cole, et al., Naturalness and Beyond: Protected Area Stewardship in an Era of Global
Environmental Change, 25 GEORGE WRIGHT F. 36, 41 (2008) (“In making decisions about whether or not
to intervene, the concept of naturalness offers little guidance. Since naturalness implies both a lack of
human effect and a lack of human control, one of the meanings of naturalness will be violated whatever
is done – or not done. Decisions must be made using some other guidance, most often a choice between
the values of preserving biodiversity and respecting nature’s autonomy.”).
120. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 4.1 (stating that Park Service “will
try to maintain all the components and processes of naturally evolving park ecosystems, including the
natural abundance, diversity, and genetic and ecological integrity of the plant and animal species native
to those ecosystems”). However, the agency has noted the importance of “natural change” as “an integral
part of the functioning of natural systems” and will manage to provide for natural change. Id.
121. On one hand, in the 1930s George Wright implicitly called for the use of historic baselines as a
management goal by calling for the management of parks to protect native species. See WRIGHT, Fauna
No. 1, supra note 102, at 108–10. On the other hand, even the Leopold Report stated that the Park Service
should ensure that its active management efforts to restore historic conditions should not interfere with
the appearance of the scenery and naturalness of the parks. LEOPOLD REPORT, supra note 106, at 242 (in
active management, “observable artificiality in any form must be minimized and obscured in every
possible way”); see also NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, Administrative Policies for Natural Areas, 1968,
reprinted in AMERICA’S NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM, supra note 94, at 354 (“natural areas shall be managed
so as to conserve, perpetuate, and portray as a composite whole the indigenous aquatic and terrestrial
fauna and flora and the scenic landscape.”) (emphasis added).
122. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 4.4.3 (allowing non-native fish stocking in
“some special situations”).
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interpretation has been so consistent that it would fix the meaning of the Organic Act
to mandate a goal of maintaining historic pre-Columbian ecological conditions and
a strong preference for hands-off management.123 Thus, even if critics are right that
the current paradigm is not well adapted to deal with climate change, changing the
paradigm would not require a change to the underlying statutory language.
D. Park-Specific Enabling Acts
In general, individual national parks and other units of the National Park
System are created by acts of Congress,124 and most of the units of the National Park
System were established by a park-specific enabling act. Those enabling acts may
impose specific management guidance or mandates. Under generally accepted
principles of statutory interpretation, where there is a conflict between the specific
guidance or mandate in the enabling act and the general principles for the entire
National Park System in the Organic Act, the enabling act language trumps the
Organic Act language.125 Prior scholarship has noted the potential for enabling act
language to constrain Park Service discretion, and the substantial amount of specific
management guidance or mandates in those acts.126 However, an analysis of park
enabling acts indicates that they would not significantly constrain Park Service
discretion in the context of active management to facilitate climate change
adaptation.
Many park-specific enabling acts require the Park Service to use its
management authority to protect park resources. For instance, the original enabling
act for the first national park, Yellowstone, requires the Park Service to “make
regulations providing for the preservation, from injury or spoliation, of all timber,
mineral deposits, natural curiosities, or wonders, within the park, and their retention
in their natural condition.”127 Similar language referring to “natural conditions” is
present in a number of other enabling acts.128 This language might be interpreted as
123. See also Joly, supra note 10, at 47 (noting that preserving historic conditions “is not a necessary
interpretation of the statutory language” and instead could be interpreted to mean allowing natural systems
to respond to climate change without major human interventions).
124. One exception is that the President can create National Monuments, managed by the National
Park Service, through unilateral executive action pursuant to the Antiquities Act. See CHRISTINE A. KLEIN
ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCES LAW: A PLACE-BASED BOOK OF PROBLEMS AND CASES 530–44 (3d ed.
2013).
125. See also 54 U.S.C. § 100755 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1c(b) (repealed 2014))
(statement that unit-specific legislation trumps general provisions of the Organic Act).
126. See Fischman, supra note 13.
127. 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2012).
128. For similar use of “natural condition” language, see enabling acts for Sequoia and Yosemite
National Parks, 16 U.S.C. §§ 43, 45b (2012); Mount Rainier National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 92 (2012);
Petrified Forest, 16 U.S.C. § 119 (2012); Hawaii National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 394 (2012); Virgin Islands
National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 398 (2012). See also Glacier National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 162 (2012) (preserving
park in a “state of nature”); Lassen National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 202 (2012) (preserving park in a “state of
nature”); Everglades National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410c (2012) (preserving park in “primitive, natural
conditions”); Cumberland Island National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459i-5(b) (2012) (preserving “primitive
conditions”). For examples of explicit adoption of a historic baseline standard, see 16 U.S.C. § 341 (2012)
(a provision for Acadia National Park that regulates management decisions on a component of the park
on Isle au Haut, which states that “no development or plan for the convenience of park visitors shall be
undertaken therein which would be incompatible with the preservation of the flora and fauna or the
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requiring the Park Service to maintain historic baselines. However, Yellowstone’s
enabling act focused on protecting the park from human exploitation and
development (“injury or spoliation”), rather than restricting the Park Service’s
discretion to take management steps to conserve or protect park resources.129 Many
enabling acts with similar language also appear to focus on requiring the Park Service
to protect the park from exploitation and development, whether in general or focused
on recreational uses.130 Other enabling acts with similar language also qualify the
mandatory language, restricting the duty to achieving natural conditions “as far as
practicable,”131 or as consistent with the conservation goals of the enabling act.132 As
discussed below, given these caveats and the absence of a definition for “natural
conditions,” it is not surprising that courts often give the Park Service broad
discretion in interpreting this language.133
A few enabling acts impose specific requirements to maintain natural
conditions or wildlife populations.134 The most specific is for Cape Lookout National
Seashore, which requires the Park Service to maintain a wild horse population of a
specific size.135 This example is unique among the enabling acts that we reviewed.
A significant number of enabling acts constrain the Park Service’s ability to either
permit or alternatively regulate hunting by the public.136 However, as discussed
physiographic conditions now prevailing or with the preservation of such historic sites and structures as
the Secretary may designate”); see also 16 USC § 459b-6 (2012) (the enabling act for Cape Cod National
Seashore) (stating that “no development or plan for the convenience of visitors shall be undertaken therein
which would be incompatible with the preservation of the unique flora and fauna or the physiographic
conditions now prevailing”).
129. See 16 U.S.C. § 22 (2012).
130. See enabling acts for Sequoia and Yosemite National Parks, 16 U.S.C. §§ 43, 45b (2012); Lassen
National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Acadia National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 341 note (2012) (provision
focused on recreational uses); Everglades National Park 16 U.S.C. § 410c (2012) (provision focused on
recreational uses); Cape Cod National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459b-2(b) (2012) (provision focused on
recreational uses); Cumberland Island, 16 U.S.C. § 459i-5(b) (provision focused on recreational uses); see
also enabling acts for Shenandoah and Great Smoky Mountains National Parks, 16 U.S.C. § 403c-3
(2012); Mammoth Cave National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 404c-3 (2012); Isle Royale National Park, 16 U.S.C.
§ 408k (2012).
131. See enabling act for Sequoia and Yosemite National Parks, 16 U.S.C. § 45b (2012).
132. See enabling act for Mount Rainier National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 92 (2012); Glacier National Park,
16 U.S.C. § 162 (2012); Lassen National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 202 (2012); Hawaii National Park, 16 U.S.C.
§ 394 (2012).
133. See infra notes 140–142.
134. See enabling act for Crater Lake National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 122a (2012) (maintenance of water
quality); Everglades National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410r-7b (“The Secretary shall manage the park in order
to maintain the natural abundance, diversity, and ecological integrity of native plants and animals, as well
as the behavior of native animals, as a part of their ecosystem.”).
135. Cape Lookout National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 459g-4(b) (2012) (agency “shall allow a herd of not
less than 110 free roaming horses, with a target population of between 120 and 130 free roaming horses”
and horse removal only permitted “as part of a plan to maintain the viability of the herd” or “in the case
of an emergency, or to protect public health and safety”).
136. For prohibitions on hunting, see, e.g., enabling acts for Yellowstone National Park, 16 U.S.C. §
26 (2012) (stating that “[a]ll hunting, or the killing, wounding, or capturing at any time of any bird or wild
animal, except dangerous animals, when it is necessary to prevent them from destroying human life or
inflicting an injury, is prohibited within the limits of said park”); Sequoia and Yosemite National Park,
16 U.S.C. § 60 (2012) (using similar language); Mesa Verde National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 117c (2012)
(using similar language); Rocky Mountain National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 198c (2012) (using similar
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below, courts have not interpreted enabling act prohibitions on hunting to prevent
the Park Service from taking its own steps to cull or manage wildlife populations.137
Finally, there are some enabling acts that require the Park Service to allow certain
development or exploitation activities, such as livestock grazing, usually
grandfathering in existing uses for a specified period of time.138
language); Lassen Volcanic National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 204c (2012) (using similar language); Olympic
National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 256b (2012) (using similar language); Hawaii National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 395c
(2012) (using similar language); Shenandoah National Park and Great Smoky Mountains National Park,
16 U.S.C. §§ 403c-3, 403h-3 (2012) (using similar language); Mammoth Cave National Park, 16 U.S.C.
§ 404c-3 (2012) (using similar language); Isle Royale National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 408k (2012) (using
similar language); Denali National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 352 (2012) (stating “[t]he said park shall be, and is
hereby, established as a game refuge, and no person shall kill any game in said park except under an order
from the Secretary of the Interior for the protection of persons or to protect or prevent the extermination
of other animals or birds”). But see, e.g., enabling acts requiring the agency to permit hunting, fishing, or
trapping: Voyageurs National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 160g (2012) (permitting recreational fishing); Virgin
Islands National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 398e (2012) (permitting bathing and fishing); Biscayne National Park,
16 U.S.C. § 410gg-2(a) (2012) (permitting fishing, except where regulation needed “in the interest of
sound conservation to achieve the purposes for which the park is established”); Great Basin National Park,
16 U.S.C. § 410mm-1(b) (2012) (permitting fishing except for “public safety” reasons); Mojave National
Preserve, 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-46(b) (2012) (permitting hunting, fishing, and trapping except “for reasons
of public safety, administration, or compliance with provisions of applicable law”); Black Canyon of the
Gunnison National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410fff-5(d)(2) (2012) (permitting hunting, fishing, and trapping in
Black Canyon of the Gunnison except “for reasons concerning public safety, administration, or public use
and enjoyment”); Alaskan National Parks, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-2 (2012) (permitting hunting and
subsistence uses in national preserves and specified national monuments and parks); Congaree National
Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410jjj-2(b) (2012) (permitting sport fishing in Congaree National Park but may regulate
“for reasons of public safety, administration, fish or wildlife management, or public use and enjoyment”);
Fire Island National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459e-4 (2012) (permitting fishing, trapping, and hunting in
Padre Island, but may restrict hunting “for reasons of public safety, administration, or public use and
enjoyment”); Assateague Island National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459f-4 (2012) (permitting hunting and
fishing, except may regulate hunting or fishing for “for reasons of public safety, administration, fish or
wildlife management or public use and enjoyment”); Cape Lookout National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459g3 (2012) (using similar language); Gulf Islands National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459h-2(a) (permitting
hunting and fishing, except may regulate hunting or fishing “for reasons of public safety, administration,
fish or wildlife management, or public use and enjoyment”); Cumberland Island Parkway, 16 U.S.C. §
459i-4 (2012) (using similar language for Cumberland Island, including trapping); Canaveral National
Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459j-3 (2012) (permitting hunting, fishing or trapping, except may regulate “for
reasons of public safety, administration, fish and wildlife management, public use and enjoyment,
protection of the resource, or competing public use”); Pictured Rocks National Lakeshore, 16 U.S.C. §
460s-4 (2012) (permitting hunting and fishing, but may regulate hunting “for reasons of public safety,
administration, or public use and enjoyment”); Apostle Islands National Lakeshore, 16 U.S.C. § 460w-4
(2012) (permitting hunting, fishing or trapping, but may regulate “for reasons of public safety,
administration, fish or wildlife management, or public use and enjoyment”); Sleeping Bear Dunes
Lakeshore, 16 U.S.C. § 460x-4 (2012) (permitting hunting and fishing, but may regulate hunting “for
reasons of public safety, administration, or public use and enjoyment”).
137. See infra Part IV.C Implications of Broad Discretion Under the Organic Act.
138. See, e.g., enabling acts for, Arches National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 272b(b)(1) (2012) (requiring
renewal of grazing permits in acquired lands for lifetime of current occupant plus any living direct
descendants); Grand Teton National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 406d-2 (2012) (grandfathering existing grazing
permits and rights-of-way in Grand Teton National Park, for lifetime of holder plus lifetime of heirs);
Everglades National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410n (2012) (authorizing drainage projects by state government in
Everglades: “[u]nless the Secretary, after notice and opportunity for hearing, shall find that the same is
seriously detrimental to the preservation and propagation of the flora or fauna of Everglades National
Park . . . [and] only after a master plan for the drainage of said lands has been approved by the State of
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Combined, these restrictions are not serious obstacles to implementing
management actions for climate change adaptation. The generic requirements of
protecting natural conditions—focused on development activities and with
qualifying language, while not defining what “natural” entails—leave significant
discretion to the Park Service.139 The more specific prohibitions focus on hunting
and fishing. It might be problematic that some units may require the Park Service to
maintain hunting or fishing over time, although the number of caveats probably gives
the Park Service significant discretion. Prohibitions on hunting in enabling acts
appear even less troublesome, given their focus on private actors rather than the Park
Service. Few enabling statutes contain any more specific mandates.
E. Case Law
A survey of forty-three cases found that in only eight cases did a court
conclude that the Park Service violated the Organic Act.140 Thus, courts defer to Park
Service implementation of the Organic Act in the majority of cases.141
Judicial deference to Park Service management choices under the Organic
Act stems from three main sources. First, the Organic Act itself (as noted above)
appears to imply a balancing among multiple goals, specifically, conservation of
park resources versus facilitating public enjoyment of those park resources. In
balancing these goals, many courts have explicitly deferred to the Park Service.142
Florida and after finding that the approved plan has engineering feasibility and is so designed as to
minimize disruptions of the natural state of the park.”); Alaskan National Parks, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh(2),
(4)(b), (6), & (10) (2012); (requiring rights-of-way for motorized use or aircraft landing rights across
specified routes or in specified locations); Alaskan National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410hh-4 (2012) (permitting
commercial fishing in specified Alaskan National Parks, including associated motorized uses and aircraft
landing); Black Canyon of the Gunnison, 16 U.S.C. §§ 410fff-2(e), 410fff-5(e) (2012) (requiring
continuation of grazing permits and off-road vehicle (ORV) use consistent with existing plan); Cape Cod
National Seashore, 16 U.S.C. § 459b-6(c) (2012) (no regulation of shellfishing or navigation); Sequoia
National Park, 16 U.S.C. § 45a-1 note (2012) (permitting power project permits); Petrified Forest National
Park, 16 U.S.C. § 119 note (2012) (permitting grazing on certain lands); Capitol Reef National Park, 16
U.S.C. § 273b note (2012) (requiring renewal of grazing permits for lifetime of holder plus direct
descendants alive at time of enactment).
139. As noted below, the lack of definition in the relevant terms in the Organic Act gives broad
discretion to the Park Service. See notes 143–145, infra.
140. See Table 1. This is a win rate of 81% for the government, about the same as or higher than the
win rates for the government in court cases challenging administrative agency decision making. Our
review only included cases in which the court specifically ruled on a plaintiff’s challenge to a Park Service
decision based on the Organic Act. We excluded concession cases, quiet title cases, criminal cases, Federal
Tort Claims Act cases, and constitutional challenges to Park Service decisions. We also excluded cases
where a decision on the merits at the trial court level was vacated by the appeals court for jurisdictional
or procedural reasons. Some of the cases that we discuss in the analysis that follows are excluded from
this table, but are nonetheless helpful because courts either discuss the Organic Act in dicta, or are
analyzing provisions of park-specific enabling acts. See also, Richard J. Pierce & Joshua Weiss, An
Empirical Study of Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 515,
519 (2011) (finding a government win rate in cases reviewing agency interpretations of statutes at about
76%); id. at 520 (summarizing other studies finding government win rates of between 55% to 80%).
141. See Antolini, supra note 19, at 891–95 (offering similar conclusions by other scholars reviewing
the case law).
142. See, e.g., City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1227 (9th Cir. 2004) (deferring to agency
balancing among development and conservation goals in reviewing development plan for old military
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Second, the Organic Act’s main terms—conservation, enjoyment, and impairment—
are not defined in the statute.143 Courts generally defer to agency interpretations and
applications of undefined terms.144 For instance, courts have applied Chevron
deference to Park Service interpretations of the Organic Act, and to balancing
between the Organic Act’s goals.145 Third, both in reviewing Park Service
interpretations of the relevant law and implementation of the statute, courts have
emphasized the Park Service’s expertise (particularly relative to courts), and have
relied on that expertise to defer to Park Service decision-making.146 That includes
Park Service identification of whether and to what extent harms to park resources
exist that require Park Service intervention, or the extent to which management
decisions will cause harm to park resources.147
Section 3 of the Organic Act authorizes the Park Service to destroy “such
animals and plant life as may be detrimental to the use” of any system unit. This
provision gives even greater discretion to the Park Service deference in the context
base); Isle Royale Boaters Ass’n v. Norton, 330 F.3d 777, 782 (6th Cir. 2003) (broad discretion for NPS
to decide where to locate docks for motorized boat access in a park, as part of agency discretion to balance
conservation and recreation goals); S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819 (10th Cir. 2000)
(“[W]e read the Act as permitting the NPS to balance the sometimes conflicting policies of resource
conservation and visitor enjoyment in determining what activities should be permitted or prohibited.”);
Bicycle Trails Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1454 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[T]he Park Service is
empowered with the authority to determine what uses of park resources are proper and what proportion
of the park’s resources are available for each use.”); Mich. United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d
202, 207 (6th Cir. 1991) (upholding NPS ban on trapping in two parks because “NPS may rationally
conclude, in light of the Organic Act . . . that its primary management function with respect to wildlife is
preservation unless Congress has declared otherwise”); Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 69 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1246–
48 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (in considering challenge to NPS road reconstruction project, stating that plaintiffs
cannot seek judicial review of agency decision to balance among goals because of agency discretion);
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 391 (D. Wyo. 1987) (“[T]he Park Service is
empowered with the authority to determine what uses of park resources are proper and what proportion
of the park’s resources are available for such use.”).
143. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Neither the
word ‘unimpaired’ nor the phrase ‘unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations’ is defined in the
Act.”).
144. See, e.g., Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2000) and Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459
F. Supp. 2d 76, 100 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[B]ecause the Organic Act is silent as to the specifics of park
management, the Secretary has especially broad discretion as to how to implement his statutory
mandate.”).
145. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186, 1187–91
(D. Utah 2005) (applying Chevron deference to NPS Management Policies defining “impairment”).
However, courts have also frequently concluded that there are no agency interpretations of the law that
are formal enough to warrant Chevron deference. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222
F.3d 819, 826; Wildearth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2013).
146. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435, 1441 (D. Montana 1996) (stating that
NPS expertise is a primary basis for deferring to NPS decisions).
147. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443, 448 (D.D.C. 1980) (stating that, in deferring
to agency decision not to assert water rights in a national park, “defendants have broad discretion in
determining what actions are best calculated to protect Park resources”); Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. at 1441 (in
upholding NPS plan to cull bison in park, stating that the “statutory purpose language obviously gives
park managers broad discretion in determining how best to conserve wildlife and to leave them unimpaired
for future generations”); Intertribal Bison Coop. v. Babbitt, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1138 (D. Montana 1998)
(deferring to agency determination as to “whether selective removal of individual bison protects and
conserves [the park] bison herd.”).
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of ecosystem management decisions.148 Courts have cited this provision in endorsing
a range of Park Service decisions to manage wildlife populations, including culling
of large mammals like elk, so long as the Park Service makes the requisite finding
that the wildlife is causing “detriment” to the park.149
Judicial deference is probably strongest where the Park Service frames a
decision as required to protect park resources—whether it is closing areas of a park
to off-road vehicles150 or culling wildlife that are harming park resources.151
However, courts have even extended deference to Park Service decision-making in
development projects—such as keeping a campground open in essential habitat for
a federally-listed population of grizzly bears,152 opening up a national recreation area
to mineral prospecting,153 or allowing commercial fishing.154
Nonetheless, courts do emphasize that the Organic Act imposes some
constraints on Park Service discretion. A number of courts have concluded that,
between the competing goals of conservation of park resources and facilitating
enjoyment by the public of park resources, conservation of park resources is the
primary goal, and in the face of substantial conflict between the goals, the Park

148. 54 U.S.C. § 100752 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014) (authorizing
the Park Service to destroy “such animals and . . . such plant life as may be detrimental to the use of
any . . . parks”)).
149. Latschar, 202 F.3d at 366–67; Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84–86 (D.D.C. 2013);
New Mexico State Game Comm’n v. Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1989) (noting that Section 3
gives agency power “in addition to [the] broad authority” under Section 1). Some courts have even
concluded that a formal finding of detriment is not required, at least for the destruction of individual
animals as opposed to a broader culling program. See Intertribal Bison Coop., 25 F. Supp. 2d at 1138–39;
Wilkins v. Sec’y of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993). Courts have also concluded that the agency
need not wait until detriment has occurred, but can act proactively under Section 3 to destroy wildlife that
might cause detriment in the future. See Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1989) (agency “need not
wait until the damage through over browsing has taken its toll on the park plant life and deer herd before
taking preventive action.”); Wilkins, 995 F.2d at 853. Another court has relied upon Section 3 to give NPS
discretion in whether to allow wildlife control efforts by state or local governments within parks. See U.S.
v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.W.Va. 1986) (stating that Section 3 gives NPS “much discretion” in
deciding whether to allow wildlife control efforts, and upholding NPS decision to require permits for state
insect spraying program in national park).
150. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1186, 1187–91 (upholding NPS decision to close
area of park to ORVs).
151. See supra note 149 (discussing cases upholding agency decision to cull park wildlife).
152. See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Park Serv., 669 F. Supp. 384, 391 (D. Wyo. 1987).
153. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380 (D. Utah 1983).
154. Alaska Wildlife Alliance v. Jensen, 108 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 1997).
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Service must favor conservation over public enjoyment.155 Courts have cited the Park
Service’s own policy documents in developing this hierarchy of uses.156
This distinction has been most frequently applied by courts in reviewing
Park Service decisions concerning so-called “consumptive uses”—uses in which
private parties would extract or exploit park resources for private gain in ways that
would diminish or harm those park resources.157 For instance, in upholding Park
Service prohibitions on hunting and trapping activities within national recreation
areas, courts have characterized hunting and trapping as “consumptive uses.”158
According to these courts, the Park Service has the power to prohibit these activities
because the Organic Act makes “preservation” of park resources the highest goal for
the Park Service, and accordingly gives the Park Service the broadest possible
authority in this area.159
In contrast, courts have upheld Park Service decisions to cull wildlife from
parks where the Park Service concludes that the wildlife is harming park resources,
drawing on the Park Service’s authority under both Sections 1 and 3 of the Organic
Act.160 Courts have upheld this authority even where park-specific enabling acts

155. See, e.g., Nat’l Rifle Ass’n v. Potter, 628 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D.D.C. 1986) (“[T]he paramount
objective of the park system with respect to its indigenous wildlife . . . was . . . one of protectionism.”);
id. at 909 (stating that the Organic Act has “but a single purpose, namely, conservation” and that based
on that purpose NPS can ban hunting and trapping in parks unless park enabling acts specifically permit
hunting and trapping); Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105 (D.D.C. 2003) (“NPS is
bound by a conservation mandate, and that mandate trumps all other considerations.”); Greater
Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 191–93 (D.D.C. 2008) (“conservation is to be
predominant”); Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2010) (“There can be no
doubt . . . that the overriding aim of the Organic Act . . . is to conserve the natural wonders of our nation’s
parks.”). Not all courts have established such a hierarchy. See supra note 143, for cases in which courts
emphasized the agency’s discretion to balance between these two goals. See also Nagle, supra note 69
(arguing that conservation and recreation are equal goals under the Organic Act).
156. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 191–93 (D.D.C. 2008);
Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 21 (D.D.C. 2010).
157. See Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2000) (concluding that the Organic
Act prohibits “consumptive use” in parks, but that a cooperative agreement with a bioprospecting
corporation was not a consumptive use because it did not authorize collection of biological samples, but
instead simply provided for division of any proceeds from successful research).
158. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 207 (6th Cir. 1991) (hunting and
trapping clearly involve a use of exploiting a park resource (wildlife) for private gain in ways that diminish
or harm that resource (by killing and removing the wildlife from the park)).
159. See id. (upholding NPS ban on trapping in parks because “Congress did not regard the National
Park System to be compatible with consumptive uses.”); see also Potter, 628 F. Supp. at 910 (upholding
NPS prohibition on hunting and trapping in entire national park system except where specifically
contemplated by Congress because “Congress did contemplate any so-called ‘consumptive’ uses of the
new park system it was creating”). Even here, however, courts recognize agency discretion in the absence
of statutory language requiring the agency to prohibit hunting. See id. at 912 (adopting agency’s
interpretation of Organic Act requiring ban on hunting and trapping as “at least a reasonable one”).
160. See, e.g., Davis v. Latschar, 202 F.3d 359 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (upholding culling of deer); Greater
Yellowstone Coal. v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435 (D. Mont. 1996) (upholding NPS plan to manage
Yellowstone bison, including allowing capture or killing of bison by state officials); Grunewald v. Jarvis,
930 F. Supp. 2d 73, 84–86 (D.D.C. 2013) (upholding agency culling of deer); Intertribal Bison Coop. v.
Babbitt, 26 F. Supp. 2d 1135 (D. Mont. 1998) (upholding NPS plan to manage Yellowstone bison,
including allowing capture or killing of bison by state officials); New Mexico State Game Comm’n v.
Udall, 410 F.2d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 1989) (upholding NPS plan to cull deer in park); Wildearth
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prohibit hunting in the park.161 The distinction appears to be that culls further a
conservation goal, while hunting furthers a recreational goal.
Some courts have characterized the Organic Act as setting a conservation
mandate.162 One court, again drawing on Park Service policies, stated that the
conservation mandate means that if a Park Service management decision presents a
conflict between recreation and conservation, it must make a finding that the decision
is necessary to achieve the recreational goals and imposes the least impacts on
conservation goals.163 This standard applies even if the management decision that
advances recreation would not cause impairment to park resources.164
The second major constraint on Park Service discretion draws on the
requirement in the Organic Act that the Park Service must maintain park resources
“unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.”165 Courts interpreting the
Organic Act cite this restriction almost uniformly,166 and have relied upon it to strike
down a number of Park Service management decisions, including those involving
off-road vehicle (ORV) use,167 oil and gas drilling,168 and a failure to assert water
rights in parks.169 Courts have identified additional sources for the non-impairment
mandate in the 1970 and 1978 amendments to the Organic Act.170 Occasionally,
Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1190 (10th Cir. 2013) (upholding NPS plan to cull elk in
park); Wilkins v. Sec’y of Interior, 995 F.2d 850 (8th Cir. 1993) (upholding NPS plan to remove wild
horses from park); Friends of Animals v. Caldwell, No. 2:09-CV-5349, 2010 WL 4259753 (E.D. Pa. Oct.
27, 2010) (upholding NPS plan to remove deer from park).
161. Greater Yellowstone Coal., 952 F. Supp. at 1442–43 (distinguishing between Park Service culling
of animals, which is permitted, and private hunting of animals, which is prohibited under Yellowstone
enabling act provision that prohibits “all hunting” in the park); Intertribal Bison Coop., 26 F. Supp. 2d at
1139 (observing that, although “all hunting” is prohibited under Yellowstone Act, statute does not limit
the authority of Park Service to cull wildlife); Wildearth Guardians, 703 F.3d at 1190 (distinguishing
between Park Service culling of animals, permitted where a finding of detriment is made, and hunting of
animals, prohibited under Rocky Mountain National Park enabling act).
162. See, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2003) (applying the
conservation mandate in the context of a challenge to NPS decision to allow snowmobiles in Yellowstone
National Park); Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp. 3d 537, 545 (E.D.N.C.
2014) (stating that “conservation is the predominant facet of the Organic Act”).
163. Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 191–93 (D.D.C. 2008).
164. Id.
165. 54 U.S.C. § 100101(a) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014)).
166. See, e.g., Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67, 84 (D.D.C. 2013); S.
Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826–29 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that “permitting
‘significant, permanent impairment’ would violate the Act’s mandate”); Conservation Law Found. v.
Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1479 (D. Mass. 1984) (seashore enabling act combined with Organic Act both
“allow for a balancing of preservation and development only to the extent that such development does not
derogate from the overriding preservation mandate.”); Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7,
21 (D.D.C. 2010) (in contrast, fewer courts have concluded that the Organic Act imposes a conservation
mandate on the agency).
167. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186, 1187–91 (D.
Utah 2005).
168. Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 103 (D.D.C. 2006).
169. High Country Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1252–53 (D. Colo. 2006).
170. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1186 (D. Utah
2005) (stating that 1978 amendment “prohibits the authorization of activities that derogate park values”);
Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2006) (stating that NPS has interpreted the 1970
amendments as restating the non-impairment standard).
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courts have identified the non-impairment mandate as not just a constraint on
affirmative Park Service management decisions, but also as imposing a duty on the
Park Service to take steps to prevent harm.171
Courts rarely apply the non-impairment mandate in a way that creates a
specific, substantive standard for the Park Service. For example, no court has held
that non-impairment absolutely prohibits particular Park Service actions, such as
construction of a road.172 Instead, courts have generally implemented the nonimpairment mandate as a procedural test. Courts require the Park Service to provide
a thorough, specific analysis of why the pursued actions will not cause
impairment.173 Courts have struck down Park Service decisions that lack specific or
coherent analysis,174 inadequately explain reversals in Park Service positions on
“impairment,”175 or fail to articulate a specific standard for impairment.176 This

171. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975) (concluding that Organic
Act, 1978 amendments, and park enabling act imposed duty on NPS to take additional steps to protect the
resources in Redwood National Park from harm from logging on neighboring lands); High Country
Citizens’ Alliance v. Norton, 448 F. Supp. 2d 1235, 1250 (D. Colo. 2006) (overturning agency decision
to relinquish water rights for a park because the agency had a duty to fight for additional rights given
earlier conclusions by the agency that water rights were necessary to protect park resources). However,
this is a duty with limits. See Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (in
follow-up case, court concluded that NPS had done all that was possible by requesting additional
appropriations to buy easements on neighboring lands, and that remaining responsibility to protect park
resources rested with Congress).
172. The best examples are cases in which courts have concluded that the agency has a duty to act
because resource conditions are imperiled and impaired. See cases cited in supra note 171 (judicial
findings implicitly concluding that impairment exists as a substantive standard and is violated by the
relevant conditions on the ground. However, even in the cases where courts have found such a duty to act,
they have relied upon NPS findings of impairment and unexplained or inadequately explained failures by
the agency to respond).
173. See also NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.7 (“Before approving a proposed
action that could lead to an impairment of park resources and values, an NPS decision maker must consider
the impacts of the proposed action and determine, in writing, that the activity will not lead to an
impairment of park resources and values.”).
174. See Sierra Club v. Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 100 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Merely describing an
impact and stating a conclusion of non-impairment is insufficient.”) (The court in Mainella drew on NPS
management policies about what factors should be analyzed to determine impairment, such as “the
particular resources and values that would be affected, the severity, duration, and timing of the impact,
the direct and indirect effects of the impact, and the cumulative effects of the impact in question and other
impacts.”). See also Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 26 (D.D.C. 2010) (failure to
consistently analyze impact of motorized watercraft).
175. See Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 92, 108 (D.D.C. 2003) (overturning agency
decision to allow snowmobiles into Yellowstone National Park because agency had not explained reversal
of earlier conclusion that snowmobile use was impairing park resources); Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar,
877 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2012) (remanding agency decision to increase ORV use because
of failure to explain change in position as to adverse impacts of that use). For an example of NPS
adequately explaining its change in position to a court, see Fund for Animals v. Norton, 512 F. Supp. 2d
49, 54–55 (D.D.C. 2007) (also explaining that agency has articulated a satisfactory explanation regarding
the use of snowmobiles in Yellowstone).
176. See Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 209–10 (D.D.C. 2008)
(overturning agency decision to allow snowmobiles into Yellowstone National Park because agency never
set specific standards for determining when impacts from snowmobiles were unacceptable or produced
impairment of park resources); Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (same conclusion in the context of agency
decision to allow oil and gas drilling beneath national park); Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 38–
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procedural form of review makes sense, given judicial deference to agency
expertise—rather than challenging Park Service expertise as to what constitutes
impairment, the courts require a rational, coherent explanation by the Park Service
for determining whether a resource is impaired.177 When such an explanation is
given, courts have been quite deferential to Park Service management decisions,
including ones with substantial impacts on park resources.178
A final significant constraint on Park Service discretion in managing the
park system is found in the 1970 and 1978 amendments to the Organic Act.179 The
Park Service has interpreted those amendments as requiring it to impose a uniform
management standard on all units within the National Park System. For instance, the
Park Service cannot apply a weaker impairment standard in National Recreation
Areas, or give a higher priority to recreation over conservation in those areas.180
Park-specific enabling acts can provide some additional specific constraints
on Park Service discretion. However, as noted above, few of the specific constraints
in those acts appear to implicate management decisions related to climate change
adaptation. Indeed, when courts have been confronted with a challenge to Park
Service decisions under the Organic Act and park-specific enabling acts, courts have
tended to emphasize Park Service discretion under both statutes.181
39 (same conclusion in context of agency decision to allow motorized watercraft in parks). Compare id.
at 37 (impact of motorized watercrafts on endangered species was adequately analyzed because it was
“guided by the Endangered Species Act” and relied on specific standards set by that Act).
177. This is consistent with the general practice of courts in reviewing administrative agency
decisions.
178. See, e.g., Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. Jewell, 965 F. Supp. 2d 67, 84–87 (D.D.C. 2013)
(upholding agency decision to authorize expansion of electricity transmission line through a park, based
on thorough agency analysis concluding that no impairment occurred). Thorough discussion of how
potential harms will be mitigated also appears to lead to more deference from the courts. See id. at 85–86
(discussing ways in which NPS would mitigate the visual impacts of a large transmission line on a park);
City of Sausalito v. O’Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1212–13 (9th Cir. 2004) (deferring to development plan for
old military base).
179. 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (as enacted by Pub. L. 91-383, § 1, Aug. 18, 1970, 84 Stat. 825 and amended
by Pub. L. 95-250, title I, § 101(b), Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 166).
180. Cf. Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1991) (in light of
these amendments, “the Park Service concluded that Congress conceived of the park system as an
integrated whole,” requiring trapping to be banned in all park units, not just some of them); Bicycle Trails
Council of Marin v. Babbitt, 82 F.3d 1445, 1453 (9th Cir. 1996) (purpose of 1978 amendments was in
part to ensure uniform standards in all units, prompting NPS decision to close areas of park to bicycles).
181. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222 F.3d 819, 826–30 (10th Cir. 2000)
(subsuming analysis of Canyonlands National Park Enabling Act into court’s analysis of Organic Act);
Bicycle Trails Council of Marin, 82 F.3d at 1453, 1461–62 (in reviewing challenge to NPS decision to
close areas of Golden Gate National Recreation Area to bicycles, court stated that the park enabling act
“in no way mandates that any particular type of recreation be given primacy over other types”); City of
Sausalito, 386 F.3d at 1227 (in deferring to agency development plan for old military base, combining
analysis and deference for Organic Act with park-specific enabling act); Grunewald v. Jarvis, 930 F. Supp.
2d 73, 84–86 (D.D.C. 2013) (in rejecting challenge to agency plan to cull deer in Rock Creek Park in
Washington, D.C., court noted that park enabling act did not speak to the issue of deer management, and
that the broad language in the enabling act, “when viewed in conjunction with the agency’s Organic Act,”
allowed for broad agency discretion); Cape Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance v. Jewell, 28 F. Supp.
3d 537, 545 (E.D.N.C. 2014) (refusing to find that enabling act constrained agency discretion under the
Organic Act). Sometimes the increased discretion under the park-specific enabling acts includes allowing
exploitation of resources within the park. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 566 F. Supp. 380, 382–85 (D. Utah
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Courts have frequently relied upon the Park Service’s own policy
documents when interpreting the nature and scope of Park Service discretion and
duties under the Organic Act.182 Sometimes courts have directly relied upon Park
Service policy documents to interpret the many ambiguous terms in the Organic
Act—on occasion, courts have given those policy documents Chevron deference.183
More often, courts rely upon Park Service policy documents in reviewing whether
particular Park Service decisions are consistent with the law.184 A few opinions
appear to equate interpretations of the Organic Act in Park Service policy documents
as definitive statements about the meaning of the Organic Act.185 However, these
opinions are probably better understood as shorthand expressions of what the court
is actually doing—either deferring to a reasonable Park Service interpretation of the
Organic Act or reaching its own independent judicial interpretation of the law by
drawing on Park Service policy documents. In the first group of cases, the Park
1983) (upholding NPS decision to allow mineral prospecting and mining to occur in national recreation
area because enabling act specifically gives agency the power to allow that activity, overriding any
possible constraints in the Organic Act). Courts have stated that if an enabling act does not specifically
constrain agency discretion, NPS can use its broad authority under the Organic Act to make decisions.
See Organized Fishermen of Florida v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 805, 812–13 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (upholding NPS
decision to ban commercial fishing in a park, in part, because “[a]t no time has Congress directed the
[agency] to take any particular actions with regard to commercial fishing within the Park” and therefore
agency has “broad administrative authority” to make decisions). The most common specific language in
various park enabling acts that is relevant for our analysis is bans on hunting. See Greater Yellowstone
Coal. v. Babbitt, 952 F. Supp. 1435, 1442–43 (D. Mont. 1996) (ban on hunting in Yellowstone enabling
act); Intertribal Bison Coop. v. Babbitt, 25 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1139 (D. Mont. 1998) (same); Wildearth
Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2013) (same). As noted above, these
provisions have not been interpreted to prevent the agency from doing its own culling of wildlife
populations. See supra note 150. Another example of enabling acts that could constrain agency decisionmaking is the Cape Cod National Seashore Act, which requires the agency to preserve “the unique flora
and fauna or the physiographic conditions now prevailing” at the time of enactment. 16 U.S.C. § 459b6(b)(1) (2012). Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467, 1478, 1484–88
(D. Mass. 1984) (interpreting this to give “primacy to preservation of the Seashore as it existed in 1961)
(relying upon language in the enabling act that required any uses to be “appropriate” to conclude that the
agency had inadequately considered the impacts of ORV use on non-motorized users). But see
Conservation Law Found. of New England v. Sec’y of the Interior, 864 F. 2d 954, 959 (1st Cir. 1989)
(appellate court upholding revised park plan for national seashore based on agency discretion, and that
rejects an interpretation of the enabling act that the agency “cannot authorize any development of the
Seashore that would alter the scenery from its condition at the time the Seashore Act was enacted.”).
182. See, e.g., S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Nat’l Park Serv., 387 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1180–90 (D.
Utah 2005); Bluewater Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20 (D.D.C. 2010); Greater Yellowstone
Coal. v. Kempthorne, 577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 190, 196 (D.D.C. 2008).
183. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 1187–89.
184. Courts have generally held that the NPS policy documents do not create binding enforceable
duties that the agency must comply with. Instead, courts will examine NPS policy documents to the extent
the agency itself relied upon them in explaining or justifying its decision; courts might rely upon the NPS
policy documents to strike down an agency decision to the extent that the agency decision is inconsistent
with the policy statements the agency relied upon, or to the extent the agency inconsistently uses or relies
upon the policy statements in the decision. See, e.g., River Runners for Wilderness v. Martin, 593 F.3d
1064, 1072 (9th Cir. 2010); Wilderness Soc’y v. Norton, 434 F.3d 584, 595 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bluewater
Network v. Salazar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 7, 20, n.13 (D.D.C. 2010); Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Kempthorne,
577 F. Supp. 2d 183, 206 (D.D.C. 2008).
185. See Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. 2d at 20–21 (drawing on policy documents to reach
conclusions about Organic Act’s balancing between conservation and recreation).
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Service should be able to rewrite the policy documents to reach a new reasonable
interpretation of the Organic Act; in the second group of cases, the relevant
interpretation of the law is fixed, but usually at a level of generality that would not
seriously constrain Park Service flexibility in implementation.
The general deference towards Park Service decision-making, combined
with the limited constraints on agency discretion that courts have gleaned from the
statutes, leads to case law that is generally more deferential to Park Service decisions
to protect park resources. In other words, courts favor management actions that are
framed as advancing protection or conservation of park resources, rather than
advancing consumptive or recreational uses. For instance, Park Service decisions to
allow ORV use in parks have been overturned by the courts on multiple occasions.186
In these cases, the courts have emphasized the Park Service’s obligation to protect
and preserve park resources.187 On the other hand, courts have upheld Park Service
decisions that could also have substantial impacts on the natural environment—for
instance, decisions to cull populations of wildlife.188 In those cases, the courts have
emphasized the Park Service’s power to take affirmative management steps to
protect park resources, and its discretion to determine what threats or harms to park
resources exist and how to address them.189
Thus, the case law is consistent with the rest of the analysis of the legal
landscape for Park Service management authority to adapt to climate change. It
supports broad Park Service discretion to take management steps, so long as those
management steps can be framed as management for the sake of conservation, not
for the sake of promoting recreation or consumptive use.
F. Overall Agency Discretion and Agency Policy Documents
The Park Service has very broad management discretion under the statute.
However, it is possible that the Park Service has limited its own discretion. The
primary vehicle for the Park Service to implement the Organic Act is through its
Management Policies: documents intended to guide Park Service employees in

186. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 194–09, and Fund for Animals v. Norton, 294
F. Supp. 2d 92, 105–06 (D.D.C. 2003) (overturning agency decision to allow snowmobiles into
Yellowstone National Park); Conservation Law Found. v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Mass. 1984)
(remanding agency decision to allow ORV use in national seashore because of failure to consider impacts
on non-motorized users); Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. at 43 (overturning NPS decision to allow
motorized watercraft into certain national parks); Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1271
(M.D. Fla. 2012) (remanding agency decision to increase ORV use). But see River Runners for
Wilderness, 593 F.3d at 1084 (upholding Park Service decision to continue to allow motorized rafting in
Grand Canyon National Park, after careful review of administrative record).
187. See Greater Yellowstone Coal., 577 F. Supp. 2d at 194–09, and Fund for Animals, 294 F. Supp.
at 105–06 (overturning agency decision to allow snowmobiles into Yellowstone National Park); Clark,
590 F. Supp. at 1490 (remanding agency decision to allow ORV use in national seashore because of failure
to consider impacts on non-motorized users); Bluewater Network, 721 F. Supp. at 43 (overturning NPS
decision to allow motorized watercraft into certain national parks); Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d at 1309
(remanding agency decision to increase ORV use). But see River Runners for Wilderness, 593 F.3d at
1084 (upholding Park Service decision to continue to allow motorized rafting in Grand Canyon National
Park, after careful review of administrative record).
188. See case examples in supra note 150.
189. Id.
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making management decisions. There are three ways in which these Policies might
constrain Park Service discretion.
First, the Park Service has interpreted the Organic Act as only permitting it
to pursue appropriate uses in the parks.190 The Management Policies give relatively
little specific guidance as to what is an appropriate use in the park, beyond indicating
that visitor enjoyment is generally an appropriate use and that other uses may be
appropriate depending on the particular context of specific parks, including
congressional language specifically mandating or authorizing a use in a park-specific
enabling act.191 The Park Service has identified a limited number of uses that are
unacceptable and therefore not permitted in parks, including new downhill ski areas
and dams.192
Second, the Park Service has interpreted the Organic Act as imposing a
conservation mandate pursuant to which “managers must always seek ways to avoid,
or to minimize to the greatest extent practicable, adverse impacts on park resources
and values,” even if those impacts would not rise to the level of impairing park
resources.193 However, the Park Service may allow adverse impacts “when necessary
and appropriate to fulfill the purposes of a park”—presumably in allowing an
appropriate use.194 A commonly appropriate use, specifically identified in the
Organic Act, is visitor enjoyment, such as hiking or backpacking. The Management
Policies make clear that “when there is a conflict between conserving resources and
values and providing for enjoyment of them, conservation is to be predominant.”195
Third, and most importantly, the Park Service states that it can never allow
impairment of park resources.196 This mandate trumps even the policy of providing
for public safety.197 The Park Service states that an “impact would be less likely to
constitute an impairment if it is an unavoidable result of an action necessary to
preserve or restore the integrity of park resources or values and it cannot be further
mitigated,”198 implying that the nature of the goal of the management action affects
the impairment analysis.
The Park Service also sets a “buffer zone” to ensure that it will not cause
impairment with its management actions. The Management Policies prevent the Park
Service from causing “unacceptable impacts,” which are defined as “impacts that fall
190. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at §§ 1.5, 8.1.1. The conservation of park
resources is, as we shall see shortly, interpreted by NPS to be its primary duty, and therefore to the extent
that conservation is a form of use, it is also an appropriate use.
191. Id.
192. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at §§ 9.3.4.3, 9.5.
193. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.3.
194. Id.
195. Id. Interestingly, the agency justifies this conclusion by stating that this “is how courts have
consistently interpreted the Organic Act.” But that is not accurate as a statement of the case law. Moreover,
a number of the cases that found a conservation mandate relied on NPS policies in reaching that
conclusion!
196. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.4.
197. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 8.2.5.1.
198. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.5 (The agency defines impairment as
depending “on the particular resources or values that would be affected; the severity, duration, and timing
of the impact; the direct and indirect effects of the impact; and the cumulative effects of the impact in
question and other impacts.”).
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short of impairment, but are still not acceptable within a particular park’s
environment.”199 Impacts are more likely to constitute impairment or be
unacceptable to the extent that they impact park resources “necessary to fulfill
specific purposes”200 or are “inconsistent with a park’s purposes or values.”201
These three constraints interact with each other. Goals that the Park Service
perceives as less-preferred by the Organic Act often face higher standards, either to
satisfy the conservation mandate or the non-impairment/unacceptable impact
mandate.202 As noted above, restoration projects are less likely to cause impairment,
and impairment or unacceptable impacts are more likely to be found if the impact
affects the purposes or goals of the park. The Management Policies cite similar
variations that apply to particular uses or facilities. For instance, although motorized
recreation can be allowed if it is “necessary and appropriate” (as long as impacts are
minimized), ORV use can only be permitted if there “will be no adverse impacts.”203
In general, rights-of-way across parks can only be granted if there are no
alternatives204 and roads must advance the mission of the park and minimize impacts
on park resources.205 Grazing and mining activities are particularly disfavored: the
former is only allowed if it will advance the mission of the park and there are no
adverse effects;206 the latter is only allowed if a park-specific enabling act has
authorized mining and there are no adverse effects.207
The Management Policies also evince a suspicion of commercial uses in
national parks. Public areas of parks cannot be used for events “primarily for the
material or financial benefit of a for-profit entity;”208 collection or consumption of
natural resources is only allowed for personal use;209 and commercial use
authorizations are only permitted if they will have “minimal impact” on park
resources, and provide an appropriate use that is consistent with the purposes of the
park.210

199. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.7.1.
200. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.5.
201. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 1.4.7.1.
202. See supra notes 196–199.
203. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at §§ 8.2.3, 8.2.3.1.
204. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 8.6.4.1 (cannot issue rights-of-way unless there
is “no practicable alternative to such use of NPS lands.”).
205. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, at § 8.6.4.4 (“The Service will generally object to
proposals for the use of park lands for highway purposes that do not directly benefit a park” (referring to
road proposals that are from outside the agency)); id. at § 9.2.1.2.2 (agency will only initiate construction
and expansion projects for roads if there are no “feasible and prudent alternative[s]” and if the project will
“minimize and mitigate harm to the park”).
206. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 8.6.8.2; see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.60(a)(3) (2015)
(grazing will only be authorized by the agency if required by law or existing rights, or as “a necessary and
integral part of a recreational activity or required in order to maintain a historic scene.”).
207. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, §§ 8.7.2, 8.7.3.
208. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 8.6.2.1.
209. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, §§ 8.8, 8.9; see also 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(c).
210. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 10.3. However, park concession activities can be
authorized if they will not cause unacceptable impacts, a laxer standard that presumably allows some
adverse impacts. See id. § 10.2.2.

232

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 56

Overall, the Management Policies set a framework that substantially
constrains Park Service discretion in ways that promote conservation over other
goals or uses of the parks that seek to minimize adverse effects on the parks. They
also appear to place particular constraints on commercial or consumptive uses of the
parks.
However, there is a major limitation on the extent to which the Management
Policies curtail Park Service discretion: courts will not enforce the Policies against
the Park Service. According to the case law, although the Policies may be internally
binding (i.e., agency leadership may discipline employees for not complying with
the Policies), they are not externally binding, in that third parties suing the Park
Service may not ask the courts to require the agency to comply with the Policies.211
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE MANAGEMENT ACTIONS TO
RESPOND TO CLIMATE CHANGE
Under the Organic Act, the Park Service has broad discretion in making
management choices. As long as the Park Service can frame its decision-making as
avoiding impairment and (at least for consistency with its own Management Policies
and some of the case law) prioritizing conservation over other uses, when terms are
vague and undefined, courts will defer to the Park Service’s expertise and
implementation of the statute. Neither the legislative history nor the Park Service’s
own history of implementation set any significant constraints on the Park Service’s
interpretation of those vague and undefined terms. Indeed, the future of climate
change may well increase the Park Service’s discretion in implementing the Organic
Act’s conservation and non-impairment mandates. Both action and inaction in
responding to the impacts of climate change can be framed as consistent with both
mandates.
A. Active Management Under the Organic Act
First, consider active management in responding to climate change: even
action so aggressive as facilitating the long-term watering of giant sequoias, assisted
migration of species not historically present in the park, or the use of chemicals or
mechanized equipment to remove non-native species whose entry into the park is
facilitated by a changing climate. All of these activities can be framed as efforts to
conserve park resources and to reduce the harms caused by climate change.
Active management is most easily understood as conservation for the
activities described in Part II.A, which can be framed as advancing resistance or
resilience in the near-term by off-setting the negative impacts of human-induced
climate change. Both irrigation of giant sequoias and removal of non-native species
are efforts to protect the park’s existing natural resources from the negative impacts
of climate change. These kinds of actions can be easily understood as conserving
park resources (consistent with the conservation mandate). They can also be
understood as efforts to either prevent impairment (by preventing future harm), or to
restore park resources from a state of impairment (by eliminating threats or current
harms). As such, these kinds of actions are consistent with current Park Service
211. See cases cited in supra note 185.
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Management Policies, including references in those Policies to a Park Service
mandate to restore resources threatened by impairment.212
Much more radical in terms of breaking from current Management Policies
are active management efforts to facilitate adaptation efforts for the long-term that
seek to manage transitions to new ecosystems, as described in Part II.B. However,
these activities could also be considered consistent with the Organic Act
conservation and non-impairment mandates.
Again, the key to understanding how these actions can be considered as
consistent with the Organic Act is to recognize that they are all efforts to manage the
impacts caused by anthropogenic climate change. Consider a species that, due to
climate change, has moved 100 miles north of its existing range into a national park,
where it was not historically present. The migration corridor for that species from its
existing habitat into the national park has been obstructed by human development
activities, preventing the species from migrating on its own. Assisted migration can
be framed as an effort to mitigate the harm on the species caused by humans, through
the combined effects of climate change and development. Without assisted
migration, the harm to species and ecosystems would be more serious. Active
intervention can then be framed as conserving resources or reducing impairment of
those resources.
But what about the fact that the species never existed in the park in the first
place? How can assisted migration of the species into the park be considered
conservation of park resources, restoration of impaired park resources, or prevention
of impairment to park resources? After all, the Organic Act mandates the Park
Service to “conserve the scenery, natural and historic objects, and wild life in the
System units.”213
One answer to this question is to consider the alternative of not intervening
to facilitate assisted migration. The park would become a suitable habitat for a
species, but that species would go extinct. Human intervention has necessarily
changed the park’s resources already—through the impacts of climate change.214 The
only issue is the level of harm that will result from that human intervention. Park
managers currently make difficult decisions about whether to remove non-native
species—in part, based on concerns about whether removal efforts will do more harm
than good, given the changes that non-native species may have already caused to
natural processes and ecosystems. Park managers sometimes allow those species to
remain, even though those non-native species might not be considered park
resources.215 Likewise, park managers will make difficult decisions about whether to
212. And note that framed as restoration efforts, they are also less likely to be considered to cause
impairment based on impacts on other resources. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, §
1.4.5.
213. See 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1 (repealed 2014)
(mandating the Park Service to “conserve the scenery and the natural historic objects and the wildlife
therein”) (emphasis added)).
214. See supra Part III, The Organic Act and Park Enabling Acts Provide Substantial Leeway for Park
Service Management Choices (describing existing and potential impacts of climate change on park
resources).
215. See, e.g., NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 4.4.4.1 (“In rare situations, an exotic
species may be introduced or maintained to meet specific, identified management needs when all feasible
and prudent measures to minimize the risk have been taken . . . .”).
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facilitate migration of species to a park, with the hope that they will not do more
harm than good by intervening.
Ultimately, the answers to these and similar questions turn on how broadly
park managers define a “park resource.” Managers might take a very narrow view of
what a resource is, excluding any species that has never been present in the park.
This would foreclose assisted migration, and indeed might cause managers to
actively resist even the unassisted migration of native species into parks due to
climate change. However, this is far from the only definition of park resources that
the Organic Act allows, given the absence of a definition in the statute, the broad
discretion afforded the Park Service by the courts, and the varying historical
implementation of the statute by the Park Service. It surely is a reasonable—and
therefore, legal—interpretation of the Organic Act for the Park Service to consider
the species that were not historically present in the park, but are moving into the
park, or would move into the park due to climate change but for other human
intervention in park resources. Once that is conceded, it becomes easy to justify
intervention based on conservation or non-impairment.216 Of course, the Organic Act
does not appear to mandate any of these interpretations of “park resources.” The key
point, here, is that these interpretations appear to be permissible under the Organic
Act.217
Similar analyses would apply to other park resources that may require
human intervention to facilitate a transition to a new ecosystem state. For instance,
consider a forest stressed by changes in temperature and precipitation, and that will
over time change to a different state (e.g., to a relatively open woodland with a
different fire regime and species composition). Again, it seems reasonable—and
therefore, permissible—for the Park Service to conclude that there would be less
harm to park resources if it were to facilitate the transition through prescribed burns,
planting different tree species, etc.218 Again, the reduction in harms by facilitating
the transition can be framed as both consistent with a conservation mandate and as
minimizing or reducing impairment.
Park Service discretion for active management is particularly broad where
it undertakes actions specifically authorized under Section 3: logging to “control
attacks of insects or diseases or otherwise conserve the scenery or the natural or
historic objects in any System unit” and the control of “animals and plant life as may
be detrimental to the use of any System unit.”219 These provisions are important for
216. The harder case is posed by a species whose suitable habitat shifts from another location into a
national park, but for which no plausible natural migration path exists, even without any additional human
impacts on the species. Even here, however, assisted migration might be justified on the grounds that the
new park resource should be conserved by assisting with its movement into the newly suitable park
habitat.
217. Efforts to introduce new species to a park might well be inconsistent with NPS Management
Policies. See NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 4.4.4.1; see also Camacho, Transforming
the Means, supra note 4, at 197–98 (“the NPS Management Policies would only allow the NPS to engage
in assisted migration in very narrow situations involving species closely related to native species and when
the effect of the introduction on the native ecosystem is minimized.”). This is an example of a broader
complexity about whether active management efforts might be consistent with the Agency’s own policies.
218. The harms might be fewer because, for instance, an unmediated transition might produce very
hot fires that cause significant soil erosion.
219. 54 U.S.C. §§ 100752, 100753 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014)).

Winter 2016

THE NPS ORGANIC ACT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

235

two reasons. First, logging, or “mechanical thinning” treatment, is often
recommended as a tool to address climate change impacts on forests.220 Likewise,
the control of non-native species may be an important aspect of management for
climate change adaptation.221 Second, the permissible reasons for invoking the
Section 3 exemptions are very broad (conserving natural or historic objects in parks
or preventing harm to the use of the parks), and many of them (specifically, insects
and disease threats) are a major impact of climate change.222
B. Passive Management Under the Organic Act
As shown in the above analysis, there are reasonable arguments on both
sides of whether active management efforts are appropriate under the Organic Act as
a response to address climate change. Therefore, Park Service decisions not to
intervene would be equally permissible under the Organic Act. Decisions not to
undertake active management for the short-term may be justified because active
management might do more harm than good to park resources.223 Potential harms
include uncertainties about its efficacy, collateral damage to other park resources,
and the expense of interventions that might foreclose other, more valuable
management efforts. Non-intervention in the short-term could also be justified
because the resources being supported by ongoing intervention (e.g., watering giant
sequoias that would otherwise die) would mean those resources are no longer natural,
and therefore, would no longer fall within the scope of either the conservation or
impairment mandates.224
Decisions not to undertake active management for the long-term225 might
be justified for the same reasons as well: active management could prove
unsuccessful, and the resulting condition of the resources might not be “natural”
(considering the transition was facilitated by humans and the new resources only
exist because of anthropogenic climate change). Non-intervention in this context
might also be justifiable for the reasons articulated in the prior discussion: because
the new species or ecosystems that managers seek to hasten the transition towards
are not park resources, given that the species existed elsewhere historically.
C. Implications of Broad Discretion Under the Organic Act
Again, the Park Service has broad discretion to respond to climate change
under the Organic Act. That discretion appears to be significantly broader than
currently recognized under the Park Service’s Management Policies, which make
only a short, passing mention of climate change without addressing the possibility of
Park Service intervention as a response.226 We believe the Park Service should
220. See note 43–46, 50, supra, and accompanying text.
221. See note 53–56, supra, and accompanying text.
222. See Part II, Management Options, supra.
223. See Part II.A., Adaptation Actions for the Near-Term, supra.
224. They could, however, qualify as scenery or historic objects and therefore still worthy of protection
under the Act.
225. See Part II.B., Adaptation Actions for the Long-Term, supra.
226. NPS MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 70, § 4.7.2 (“Earth’s climate has changed throughout
history. Although national parks are intended to be naturally evolving places that conserve our natural and
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prioritize working through the issues addressed in this article, including the role that
active management should play in the Park Service’s response to climate change.
The Park Service should try to define the relevant terms in this context (e.g., what
“impairment” means in a world of changing climate) and then make fundamental
ethical and policy decisions about the resources that count in its conservation or
impairment analyses. In so doing, the Park Service will have significant leeway to
shape its response.
However, the Park Service’s broad leeway under the Organic Act to
respond to climate change may be problematic. Two concerns come to mind. First,
there is a risk that active management for climate change will be used as a cover for
goals not permitted under the Organic Act—the risk of “duplicity.”227 Second, there
is a risk that active management for climate change will be pursued for the right
reasons, but will be inefficacious or even counterproductive—the risk of “unintended
consequences.”
With respect to the first concern, duplicity, one example might be the Park
Service justifying commercial green-tree or salvage logging as a necessary response
to the fire risks caused by climate change.228 Here, the language of the Organic Act
and case law interpreting it are both tools to prevent the misuse of active
management.
Courts have already closely examined Park Service management decisions
to determine whether those management decisions are permissible ones intended to
conserve park resources, or prohibited ones intended to facilitate consumptive use of
park resources. This distinction can be seen in cases upholding Park Service
decisions to cull wildlife in parks, despite park-specific enabling acts that prohibit
hunting. Both hunting and culling involve the killing of animals. However, the Park
Service has drawn a distinction between culling activities (which it states are
consistent with Section 3 of the Organic Act) and hunting activities (which are
generally prohibited in parks, even if no enabling act prohibits hunting).

cultural heritage for generations to come, accelerated climate change may significantly alter park
ecosystems. Thus, parks containing significant natural resources will gather and maintain baseline
climatological data for reference.”) As the example of assisted migration makes clear, there may be a
substantial number of active management techniques that are effectively prohibited by the Agency’s
management policies, particularly those focused on long-term facilitation of changes to novel ecosystems
or situations. It seems more likely that active management efforts focused on short-term resistance and
resilience more easily fit within the Agency’s policies as restoration efforts.
227. The risk of duplicity is similar to what Holly Doremus calls the “slippery slope argument” that
“if commercial use is allowed at all, it may prove impossible to restrict it” because it will “inevitably
produce focused political pressures for expansion.” Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge, and Profit: The
Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and the Core Purposes of America’s National Parks, 26
ECOLOGY L. Q. 401, 472 (1999); see also Long & Biber, supra note 22, at 663‒65 (noting concerns about
how political pressures may warp active management for climate change).
228. Given the exemption for tree harvesting in Section 3 of the Organic Act, this is a plausible future
scenario. Arguments that commercial tree harvesting is necessary to respond to wildfire impacts produced
by climate change already widely made in the political arena with respect to the Forest Service. See
Litigation and Increased Planning’s Impact on Our Nation’s Overgrown, Fire-Prone National Forests,
Hearing before the H. Subcomm. on Federal Lands of the Natural Resources Comm., 114th Congress 1–
5 (2015), http://naturalresources.house.gov/UploadedFiles/HearingMemoFL_5_14_15.pdf (arguing that
decreased commercial timber harvesting on National Forest lands has led to increased wildfire risk).
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The decision in Wildearth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv. is an excellent
example of this distinction.229 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit upheld a Park Service program in which authorized, private parties killed elk
within the borders of the park—even though the park enabling act prohibited all
forms of hunting—by distinguishing hunting from culling.230 According to the Court
(drawing on the Park Service’s own analysis), the key distinction is that hunting “is
the recreational pursuit of game for meat and sport, with incidental management
effects on game populations, while [culling] is the closely supervised killing of game
to control its population.”231 Thus, even private parties authorized and supervised by
the Park Service could kill elk in the park—not just the Park Service personnel.
Note how this distinction draws upon the differences of the goals of the
activity. The United States District Court opinion emphasized this distinction and
connected it to the distinction between consumptive use and conservation of
resources:
Culling occurs when animals are destroyed primarily for
conservation purposes, while hunting occurs when the destruction
is primarily for recreational purposes. Culling is conducted under
controlled circumstances under the direction and supervision of
Park Service personnel, while hunting is performed at the hunter’s
discretion (subject to the terms of any applicable license conditions
and regulations) and with elements of ‘fair chase’ present. Culling
does not allow the person who killed the animal to keep the meat,
hunting does. Put simply, culling services the public purpose,
while hunting serves both public and private purposes.232
This distinction, based on the goals of the management action, is not unique
to the hunting versus culling context in parks. In Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt,233 the
Court considered a challenge to an agreement between the Park Service and a private
entity about the method of sharing proceeds from scientific discoveries developed
from biological research in Yellowstone National Park.234 The agreement was
challenged as an impermissible consumptive use, but the Court disagreed. It held that
research in which biological samples are removed from the park cannot be deemed
impermissible consumptive use because that would “necessarily imply that every
other scientific research permit issued over the past century was equally invalid.”235
The Court upheld the agency’s distinction between making money from the direct
sale of specimens collected in the park, which would be prohibited, and “profiting
from a future development based on scientific discoveries resulting from research on

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Wildearth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 703 F.3d 1178, 1191–92 (10th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 1182, 1187–88, 1192.
Id. at 1191.
Wildearth Guardians v. Nat’l Park Serv., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1159 (D. Colo. 2011).
Edmonds Institute v. Babbitt, 93 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2000).
Id. at 64–65.
Id. at 71.

238

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Vol. 56

those resources, which is permitted.”236 Again, the purpose of the direct activities in
the park—research—made the activity permissible, even if there could eventually be
commercial gain as well.
This kind of close judicial review of Park Service management efforts to
ensure that the Park Service seeks to fulfill the appropriate and permissible goal of
conservation and does not cross the line into impermissible consumptive use
provides a useful check on the abuse of active management for purposes of climate
change adaptation. A Park Service effort to open a park to public hunting based on
claims that hunting would help control wildlife would likely (and appropriately)
receive careful scrutiny from the courts.
This kind of close judicial review should and would apply to Park Service
efforts to rely on the provisions in Section 3 of the Organic Act.237 The first provision
is limited to specific purposes—“to control attacks of insects or diseases or otherwise
conserve the scenery or the natural or historic objects in any” park.238 Broadening
this provision to give the Park Service carte blanche to pursue a wide range of
development and consumptive activities would fundamentally undermine the
purposes of Section 1 of the Organic Act.239 Indeed, the provision appears to require
that all timber activities advance the conservation of park resources articulated in
Section 1, since the text requires that the goal be to “control attacks of insects or
diseases or otherwise conserve” park resources, implying that controlling insects and
diseases is a specific form of conservation.240
The second provision in Section 3 is limited to control of wildlife or plants
that interfere with the “use” of the park. In the context of the Organic Act as a whole,
this provision would mean interference with the two primary purposes laid out in
Section 1: conservation of park resources and visitor enjoyment. Again, the purposes
of wildlife control are strictly limited, and do not include advancing private interests.
Finally, the amendments to the Organic Act in 1970 and 1978 clarified that
all actions within the National Park System must be consistent with the purposes of
Section 1.241 Congress required that all “regulation of the various areas of the
National Park System . . . shall be consistent with and founded in the purpose
established by Section 1 of this title.”242 Further, Congress mandated that all:

236. Id. at 72. For a thoughtful discussion of the underlying bioprospecting agreement, and an
argument that these kinds of agreements are inconsistent with the purposes of National Parks, see
Doremus, supra note 228, at 451‒87.
237. All of the hunting and culling cases depend on interpretations of the scope of Section 3 of the
Organic Act, for instance. See supra notes 149–150.
238. 54 U.S.C. § 100753 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014)).
239. For the legislative history indicating that commercial exploitation of park resources, especially
timber harvesting, are contrary to the purposes of the Organic Act, see supra note 84.
240. 54 U.S.C. § 100752 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 3 (repealed 2014) (“The
Secretary may provide for the destruction of such animals and plant life as may be detrimental to the use
of any System unit.”)).
241. See 54 U.S.C. 100101(b) (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (repealed 2014)) (as
enacted by Pub. L. 91-383, § 1, Aug. 18, 1970, 84 Stat. 825 and amended by Pub. L. 95-250, title I, §
101(b), Mar. 27, 1978, 92 Stat. 166)).
242. 54 U.S.C. § 100101 (2014) (amending and replacing 16 U.S.C. § 1a-1 (repealed 2014)). As a
later amendment to the Organic Act, this would supersede any contrary language in Section 3 that might
allow management that is contrary to the purposes of Section 1 of the Organic Act.
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authorization of activities shall be construed and the protection,
management, and administration of these areas shall be conducted
in light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park
System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and
purposes for which these various areas have been established,
presumably including Section 1’s overall mandate to the Park Service.243
Thus, a Park Service decision to allow commercial logging to facilitate
climate change adaptation would rightfully come under close scrutiny and would
probably (like hunting) be considered a prohibited use.244 In contrast, a Park Service
decision to allow non-commercial thinning to facilitate adaptation would more likely
survive scrutiny, and, like culling, could be considered a permissible nonconsumptive use.
Courts have closely reviewed land management decision-making this way.
A careful examination of Park Service decision-making to ensure that neither its
purpose nor effect advances prohibited commercial uses is a standard that courts
have long applied in reviewing Park Service management decision-making on
wilderness areas, particularly where the Wilderness Act explicitly prohibits
commercial uses.245 Although the Organic Act does not specifically prohibit
commercial uses, it does explicitly permit only two goals: conservation and visitor
enjoyment. Neither of these would include commercial consumptive uses.246
What about reducing the risk of unintended consequences? Here, we believe
that establishing a thoughtful, deliberative process to consider these kinds of active
management interventions is essential. NEPA, the ESA, and other laws already
require this process. However, the Park Service would benefit from establishing an
explicit process requiring a close analysis of whether and when particular active
management interventions advance climate change adaptation and fulfill the Park
Service’s mandates under the Organic Act.247 Such a process would reduce the risk
of ill-advised active management steps that do more harm than good. It could also
prompt more deferential judicial review of Park Service decisions.
To the extent that the burdens of such a thoughtful, deliberative process
could create an incentive for the Park Service to prefer passive to active management
in responding to climate change, this is generally a good thing. As noted elsewhere,
243. Id. This last provision does conclude with the language: “except as may have been or shall be
directly and specifically provided by Congress.” However, given the broad language of Section 3 and how
it can be interpreted consistent with Section 1 of the Organic Act, this provision can best be read as
referring to specific management direction in park enabling acts.
244. While the provision does allow for the sale of timber, this is best read as allowing the agency to
reduce the costs of an action that it would otherwise already take by selling usable timber products. It
should not be interpreted to allow for commercial timber harvesting or general revenue raising activities
by the agency.
245. Long & Biber, supra note 22, 678–80.
246. See Doremus, supra note 228, at 469–76 (arguing that commercial uses in National Parks should
be strictly limited). Other agency procedures may also help minimize the risk of improper motives guiding
agency decisions. For instance, thorough NEPA review can help highlight inconsistencies between the
purported motive for an agency decision and its actual implementation.
247. To minimize administrative burdens, such a process could be incorporated into the agency’s
existing decision-making procedures, such as the requirement that park managers make findings as to
impairment, and the agency’s NEPA review processes.
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active management creates challenges and risks that passive management does
not.248 This does not mean that active management is an inappropriate response for
many challenges; rather, it means that the Park Service should not rush to
wholeheartedly embrace active management as its primary response to climate
change.

248. Long & Biber, supra note 22, at 658–64.
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CASE NAME

CITATION

RULING
FOR
NPS?

Alaska Wildlife
Alliance v. Jensen

108 F.3d 1065
(9th Cir. 1997)

Yes

Bicycle Trails
Council of Marin
v. Babbitt

82 F.3d 1445
(9th Cir. 1996)

Yes

Bluewater Network
v. Salazar

721 F.Supp.2d 7,
30 (D.D.C.
2010)

No

City of Sausalito v.
O’Neill

386 F.3d 1186
(9th Cir. 2004)

Yes

Conservation Law
Found. of New
England, Inc. v.
Clark

590 F. Supp.
1467 (D. Mass.
1984)

Yes

Daingerfield Island
Protective Soc’y v.
Babbitt

40 F.3d 442
(D.C. Cir. 1994)

Yes

Davis v. Latschar

202 F.3d 359
(D.C. Cir. 2000)

Yes

Defenders of
Wildlife v. Salazar

877 F. Supp. 2d
1271 (M.D. Fla.
2012)

No

93 F. Supp. 2d
63 (D.D.C.
2000)

Yes

Edmonds Institute
v. Babbitt

241

NOTES

Appeal affirming NPS
decision after remand:
Conservation Law
Found. of New England,
Inc. v. Sec’y of the
Interior, 864 F.2d 954
(1st Cir. 1989).
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RULING
FOR
NPS?

NOTES
Affirmed, 434 F. App’x
72 (3d Cir. 2011)
(affirming case only
addresses the NEPA
claims).

CASE NAME

CITATION

Friends of Animals
v. Caldwell

No. 2:09-CV5349, 2010 WL
4259753, (E.D.
Pa. Oct. 27,
2010)

Yes

Fund for Animals
v. Mainella

294 F. Supp. 2d
46 (D.D.C.
2003)

Yes

Fund for Animals
v. Norton

294 F. Supp. 2d
92 (D.D.C.
2003)

No

Greater
Yellowstone Coal.
v. Babbitt

952 F. Supp.
1435 (D. Mont.
1996)

Yes

Greater
Yellowstone Coal.
v. Kempthorne

577 F. Supp. 2d
183 (D.D.C.
2008)

No

High Country
Citizens’ Alliance
v. Norton

448 F.Supp.2d
1235 (D. Colo.
2006)

No

Int’l Snowmobile
Mfrs. Ass’n v.
Norton

340 F. Supp. 2d
1249 (D. Wyo.
2004)

No

Intertribal Bison
Coop. v. Babbitt

25 F. Supp. 2d
1135 (D. Mont.
1998)

Yes

Denial of request for
preliminary injunction
because plaintiff unlikely
to succeed on merits of
Organic Act claim,
affirmed, Greater
Yellowstone Coal. v.
Babbitt, 108 F.3d 1385
(9th Cir. 1997).

Affirmed at 175 F.3d
1149 (9th Cir. 1999).
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CASE NAME

CITATION

RULING
FOR
NPS?

Mausolf v. Babbitt

125 F.3d 661
(8th Cir. 1997)

Yes

Mich. United
Conservation
Clubs v. Lujan

949 F.2d 202
(6th Cir. 1991)

Yes

Nat’l Parks
Conservation
Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior

No. 2:11-CV578-FTM29CM, 2015 WL
476163 (M.D.
Fla. Feb. 5,
2015)

Yes

Nat’l Parks
Conservation
Ass’n v. Jewell

965 F.Supp.2d
67 (D.D.C.
2013)

Yes

Nat’l Riffle Ass’n
v. Potter

628 F. Supp. 903
(D.D.C. 1986)

Yes

Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Nat’l Park
Serv.

669 F. Supp. 384
(D. Wyo. 1987)

Yes

New Mexico State
Game Comm’n v.
Udall

410 F.2d 1197
(10th Cir. 1969)

Yes

Organized
Fishermen of
Florida v. Watt

590 F. Supp. 805
(S.D. Fla. 1984)

Yes

River Runners for
Wilderness v.
Martin

593 F.3d 1064
(9th Cir. 2010)

Yes

Sierra Club v.
Andrus

487 F. Supp. 443
(D.D.C. 1980)

Yes
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NOTES

Currently being
appealed.

Affirmed by 775 F.2d
1544 (11th Cir. 1985)
(no discussion of
Organic Act).

Affirmed at 659 F.2d
203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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CASE NAME

CITATION

RULING
FOR
NPS?

Sierra Club v.
Babbitt

69 F. Supp. 2d
1202 (E.D. Cal.
1999)

Yes

Sierra Club v.
Dep’t of Interior

398 F. Supp. 284
(N.D. Cal. 1975)

No

Order modified by 424
F. Supp. 172 (1976).

Sierra Club v.
Mainella

459 F.Supp.2d
76 (D.D.C.
2006)

No

Appeal dismissed 2007
WL 1125716 (D.C. Cir.
2007).

Sierra Club v. Watt

566 F. Supp. 380
(D. Utah 1983)

Yes

Southern Forest
Watch, Inc. v.
Jewell

No. 3:13-CV116, 2015 WL
1457978 (E.D.
Tenn. Mar. 30,
2015)

Yes

Southern Utah
Wilderness
Alliance v. Nat’l
Park Serv.

387 F Supp. 2d
1178 (D. Utah
2005)

Yes

The Fund for
Animals v. Norton

512 F. Supp. 2d
49 (D.D.C.
2007)

Yes

U.S. v. Moore

640 F. Supp. 164
(S.D. W. Va.
1986)

Yes

Udall v.
Washington, Va. &
Md. Coach Co.

398 F.2d 765
(D.C. Cir. 1968)

Yes

W. Watersheds
Project v. Salazar

494 F. App’x
740 (9th Cir.
2012)

Yes

NOTES

On appeal at time of
publication.

Affirmed by 552 F.2d
817 (8th Cir. 1977) (no
Organic Act holding).

Winter 2016

THE NPS ORGANIC ACT AND CLIMATE CHANGE

CASE NAME

CITATION

RULING
FOR
NPS?

WildEarth
Guardians v. Nat’l
Park Serv. II

703 F.3d 1178
(10th Cir. 2013)

Yes

Wilderness Soc’y
v. Norton

434 F.3d 584
(D.C. Cir. 2006)

Yes

Wilkins v. Sec’y of
Interior

995 F.2d 850
(8th Cir. 1993)

Yes

Fund for Animals
v. Norton

512 F.Supp.2d
49 (D.D.C.
2007)

Yes

Save Sandy Hook
Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Interior

No. 04-5908
(MC), 2007 WL
2704813 (D.N.J.
Sept. 13, 2007)

Yes

Isle Royale Boaters
Ass’n v. Norton

330 F.3d 777
(6th Cir. 2003)

Yes

Table 1.

245

NOTES

Affirming 804 F. Supp.
2d 1150 (D. Colo. 2011).

Reversing 798 F. Supp.
557 (E.D. Mo. 1992).

Affirmed 293 Fed.
Appx. 896 (3d Cir.
2008).

